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CONTINUING CLASSROOM CONVERSATION BEYOND
THE WELL-PLACED "WHYS?"

Bailey Kuklin" and Jeffrey W. Stempel"Four well-placed 'whys?' will stop any conversation."
-George Santayana'
INTRODUCTION

T.Ldevery
AW school classes regularly prove Santayana's aphorism. Although nearly
law teacher desires to keep discussion focused and forward-moving,
there are more than a few moments of thundering silence experienced in the
classroom. Most of us adjust to this inevitability by positing some pedagogical virtue
to still air and contenting ourselves with the knowledge that conversation-stopping
"whys?" are usually delivered by us as teachers rather than the students. Perhaps we
are underappreciative of the value discomfitting silence has, but we generally prefer
that the conversation continue, that we miss the opportunity to feel simultaneously
smug and uncomfortable, and that students be both more reflective and expansive in
class.
In our view, much of the "conversation-stopping" occurs because students are
insufficiently grounded in the background knowledge necessary to carry a discussion
of a case, statute, or problem beyond the four corners of the text under review. This
problem is different from the normal absence of legal information that necessarily
befalls law students.2 The latter problem is to be expected. But less expected, or
hoped for, is the typically inadequate briefing on other information useful for
studying the law. At the outset of legal education, cases and concepts often strike
students as having an air of inevitability that tends to stifle or suppress critical
thinking. Judges, after all, normally portray their conclusions as inescapable.
Because of this, the proverbially well-placed "why?"-not directly answerable by
resorting to the text of the appellate opinion-tends to silence the class. Even in
*

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. We wish to thank Deans Joan
Wexler, Don Weidner, Paul LeBel and the faculties of the Brooklyn Law School and Florida State
College of Law for assistance and ideas. This article, which was supported by Brooklyn and Florida
State research stipends, is dedicated to our students, no matter what they say about us on the evaluation
forms.
1. Attributed to George Santayana.
2. For example, a student reading an older tort case on contributory negligence (e.g., Baker v.
Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808)) will be unable to draw specifically upon decisions to the contrary
in favor of comparative negligence (e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975)). Similarly,
reading the first negligence case involving a defective product, a student cannot be expected to
consider strict liability as an alternative liability regime since the student has yet to encounter such
cases and realistically will not be able to "think up" this possibility without first having further
experience with tort law (and perhaps a client in need of this liability regime as well).
**
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advanced classes, silence may reverberate if the students have not mastered the
resources from which diverse views can be mined.
Although students cannot be expected to begin with enough law and legal history
to maintain a critical perspective in the face of the portrayed certainty of assigned
cases, students with some background in the underlying factors of the law and some
analytic insight can arrive at their own criticisms and assessments once they become
confident enough to believe they can. Armed with sufficient tools, students can learn
to become the discerning critics that classic legal education has been assumed to
produce. Adequately grounded, students can do more than reproduce legal doctrine
and internal debates about law, they can learn to advance beyond the conclusory
rhetorical force of the cases. They can learn-as can we-to continue meaningful
conversation in the face of well-placed "whys?." Not forever, of course, as the
postmodernists insist,3 for ultimately Santayana's aphorism prevails at a point calling
for an active choice rather than a passive, necessary conclusion (e.g., "because the
law here subscribes to utilitarian reasoning"). But at this point, the students are in
a position to broadly survey the entire legal terrain, if not its as-yet-unlearned
structures, perceiving its breadth and depth, and understanding why legal reason ends
where it does.
We felt strongly enough about this view to write a book supporting it,4 one that
contends law today is dramatically molded by our learning regarding ethics,
economics, political theory, American government structure, the adversary system,
and (not surprisingly) jurisprudential movements. 5 Therefore, we argue, most legal
subjects can be effectively analyzed by reference to this broader learning. Because
it reveals the pervasive forces molding the law, making the law more explicable,
predictable and coherently moldable, we believe that law schools owe it to their
students to ensure that they all are exposed to these basic foundational concepts.
Assessing legal outcomes according to only, or even primarily, a decision's internal
consistency and relation to precedent and statute eliminates too much potential for
teaching students to become discerning consumers of law rather than merely vessels
3. For a general introduction to postmodemism, see generally CHRIsTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S
WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM 1-48 (1990); STEPHEN TOuLMIN, COSMOPOLIS 5-44 (1990).
4. See generally BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994).

5. Which means, of course, that not all of what we regard as key background information is
extralegal in traditional thinking. But we here emphasize what falls outside the traditional boundaries.
Much important jurisprudential writing is done by nonlawyers (e.g., Rawls). In the end, we subscribe
to Stanley Fish's suggestion that these nontraditional sources be considered part of disciplinary, rather
than interdisciplinary, studies:
[The so-called interdisciplinary studies] are engaging in straightforwardly disciplinary tasks that
require for their completion information and techniques on loan from other disciplines, or they
are working within a particular discipline at a moment when it is expanding into territories
hitherto marked as belonging to someone else-participating, that is, in the annexation by
English departments of philosophy, psychoanalysis, anthropology, social history, and now, legal
theory; or they are in the process of establishing a new discipline, one that takes as its task the
analysis of disciplines, the charting of their history and of their ambitions.
STANLEY FISH, Being InterdisciplinaryIs So Very Hard to Do, in THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE
SPEECH 231, 242 (1994).
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for absorbing legal runoff. In particular, the standard case and problem methods of

classroom instruction will be enriched by injecting foundational considerations and
critique.6

Embracing multidisciplinary perspectives, as an instrument, when closely
examining course material cuts two ways. In one direction, the instrument is a
microscope through which students will gain deeper insight into the law in general
and specific issues. In the other direction, by looking through the instrument from
the vantage point of the legal materials, it becomes a telescope through which the
students will gain deeper insight into the nature and reach of these multidisciplinary
materials. By struggling with the merits of a complex issue, students will better
master the tools provided by ethics, economics, political theory, governmental

structure, dispute resolution, jurisprudence, etc. Then, the comprehensive study
becomes a two-way street. In both directions, the road leads to greater knowledge

and understanding.
Of course, saying that one will bring this benefit to the table and doing it are two
different things. Even though we modestly believe our book successfully records the

essence of what law students should know of this background information, we are
left with the nagging question of how to transfer this information from written
expositions to student cognition and classroom discourse about cases, legislation, and
legal policy.' For the most part, our approach has been annoyingly reminiscent of an
athletic shoe advertising slogan in that we have told ourselves and our students to
"Just Do It."8 When we tried to reduce this aspect of our pedagogy to writing,9 we
found ourselves taking essentially the same tack. After further experience and
reflection, however, our annoyance turned, if not to exuberance, at least to a

comfortable resignation.
6. This idea, of course, is not new, but is frequently neglected or forgotten. One of the primary
"establishment" legal figures subscribed to the foundational approach.
To sum up. I should put as the content of a good legal education:
(1)
A solid all round cultural training, with the grasp of significant information which such
a training involves, but much more with the broadening and deepening of experience and
ability to appraise information to which it leads.
(2)
A grasp of the ends of technique of the social sciences-this only; for beyond that what
has been taught in their name has been short-lived.
(3)
A grasp of the history and system of the common law, of the outline and ends of the legal
order, of the theory and ends of the judicial and administrative processes, and of the
history, organization, and standards of the legal profession.
(4)
A thorough grasp of the organization and content of the authoritative legal materials of
the time and place and of the technique of developing and applying them.
Roscoe Pound, What Isa GoodLegal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 627, 631 (1933).
7. Or perhaps the converse is true: students may first find multidisciplinary material important
to class discussion and thereby more easily absorb the assigned reading of such material.
8. If only we were confident that we were as successful as the advertising slogan! See DONALD
A. KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT IN THE CORPORATE WORLD 145-46 (1994) (noting the "just do
it" slogan and accompanying ad campaign catches the fancy of the public and enters popular
discourse).
9.

See generally BAILEY KUKLIN& JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY
JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994) [hereinafter
TEACHER's MANUAL].
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Experience and reflection have not shaken our earlier conviction that virtually any
legal datum can be placed under the edifying microscope provided by an
understanding of foundational factors. Effecting deeper and more critical student
understanding does not require dramatic changes in classroom format or course
organization. Yet, enriched multidisciplinary consideration of law can occur even
as the traditional classroom and, by this time, clinical law school courses, continue
to evolve into newer models.
To illustrate these points, we examine a classic case, MacPhersonv. Buick Motor
Co., 0 found in many casebooks on legal process," torts, 2 and products liability. 3
The opinion, written by the esteemed Benjamin Cardozo,' 4 is surely among the most
famous and influential in American law." In spite of that,'6 MacPhersonreads
matter-of-factly as though the court is simply situating the instant case in one column
of precedent finding liability rather than in another column of precedent finding no
liability. If MacPhersonwas not prominently featured in casebooks, the typical
student happening upon it in a regional reporter would probably pass it by as
unimportant or as flowing obviously from more important precedents. Examining
MacPhersonfrom new angles, we can highlight both the importance of this "stealth"
decision and the tensions within legal policy imbedded in the decision.
Prior to the examination of MacPherson,we briefly review the traditional methods
of law school teaching and the modem critique. We omit detailing the
multidisciplinary considerations, for we have done so elsewhere and believe that our
use of them in questioning MacPhersonindirectly brings out the necessary points.
Next, we examine the facts and reasoning of the case, situating it within the existing
precedent. But, like Cardozo, we omit policy discussion at this point. Then, we get
10. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
11. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 354 (2d ed. 1996); ROBERT N.
COVINGTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A COURSE ON LEGAL METHODS 140 (1969); HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF LAW 545 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); HARRY W. JONES
ET AL., LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 163 (1980); R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D.
KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 92 (1984); STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMES S. ZAINALDIN,
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 860 (3d ed. 1995).
12. See, e.g., GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & JAMES E. MEEKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 579 (2d ed. 1990); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 733 (6th ed. 1995);
MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 473
(6th ed. 1996); MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 317 (1994); JAMES A. HENDERSON,
JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 563 (4th ed. 1994); PAGE KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 635 (2d ed. 1989); JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 695 (9th ed. 1996).
13. See, e.g., DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 4 (1988); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 10 (2d ed. 1992); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY
48 (2d ed. 1989).
14. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 74-91 (1990)
(explaining that Cardozo is held in "high repute" as one of the most prominent figures in American
law).
15. See id at 109 ("MacPherson is Cardozo's most important opinion in terms of impact on the
law.").
16. Or, perhaps, because of that. See id. at 105-13 (discussing that MacPherson has been so
influential in large part because the style of the opinion portrays the case as nonrevolutionary).

Fall 1997]

WELL-PLACED "WHYS?"

to the heart of the matter by asking the "whys?" that direct attention to the
multidisciplinary background topics we have addressed elsewhere. These "whys?"
are not all "well-placed" in that an understanding of the legal background will allow
the conversation to continue beyond them. Although our exploration is most
applicable for legal process, torts, or products liability courses (or a seminar on
Cardozo), we believe its methodology can be imported profitably into any law school
course. Finally, we offer a few caveats about using the multidisciplinary approach
across the curriculum.
I. FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING CLASSROOM MATERIAL

A.

The TraditionalLaw School ClassroomandModern Change

Implicit in our discussion is the notion that most law school courses continue to
approach teaching based on the Langdell case method in which the bulk of discussion
in each class focuses on a few select cases. 7 The professor usually follows what has
come to be termed the "modified Socratic style" in which the instructor calls on
students to discuss leading or exemplary cases. Even under the "problem method,"
in which hypotheticals (often based on actual cases) relating to excerpted cases,
statutes and other materials are central, the problems are usually addressed as if they
were cases under the modified Socratic style. The procedure remains Socratic to the
extent that the questioning is designed to elicit from students an analysis of the case
or problem, a distillation of the legal principles emerging from it, and the possible
applications of these principles to various hypothetical scenarios.
The prevailing procedure differs from that used a generation earlier in that the
modem instructor often poses questions to the class as a whole and seeks volunteers,
rather than picking a student at random and mercilessly staying with him or her
regardless of that student's level of preparation or understanding. In essence, this is
a kinder, gentler version of John Osbourne's Professor Kingsfield, 8 but it is
17. Undoubtedly, other cases are touched upon because they are mentioned in the main cases or
the notes which follow in the casebook. We do not suggest that during the average law school class
the student learns about only two or three cases. We do suggest that most of the class period revolves

only around a few cases.
Certainly, students all too frequently act as if the highlighted cases are the be-all-and-end-all of
legal education. We know of many students who essentially admit that virtually all of their class

preparation time is spent immersing themselves in the major cases slated for class discussion. Some
admit to never reading the notes or other coursebook material during the school year.
18.

See JOHN OSBOURNE, THE PAPER CHASE (1971). As a result of the success of Osboume' s

book, a major motion picture, and a short-lived television series based on it, Kingsfield (played
irascibly and exquisitely in the movie by the late John Houseman) has for both laypersons and
incoming law students become the archetype of the stem, but wise, traditional Socratic professor.
More recent personal accounts of law school education have softened Kingsfield around the edges but
have continued to reflect the first-year student's anxiety and initial awe at encountering new material
of such volume and difficulty. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE:
CONFESSIONS OF AJOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL (1991) (reflecting angst even when focusing on
the warm and humane Guido Calabresi rather than a Kingsfield-style professor); SCOTT TURow, ONE

L: A STUDENT'S FIRST YEAR AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1977) (describing legal education with
breathless suspense that fits much better rhetorically with the murder trial plot in his later bestseller,
PresumedInnocent (1987)).
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essentially still the case method with Socratic question-and-answer exposition of the
material.
Since the culmination of legal realism's partial conquest of law, traditional
Langdellian methods have undergone change. Cases are no longer the sole focus of
legal education. The realists moved away from the basic Langdell-style casebook
that only contained unabridged appellate opinions. Instead, they edited the main
cases and provided some commentary on them, introductory essays to topics, related
statutes, and discussion and excerpts from other cases and secondary sources, such
as restatements, treatises and law review articles. 9 But even the "new" post-realist
casebook retains a core of prominently excerpted appellate opinions-providing the
star around which the other materials orbit.
The classrooms reflect the casebooks, or vice versa. Irrespective of the reach of
supplemental materials, the focus of most classroom discussion is the prominently
excerpted cases or case-like problems. Like B.F. Skinner's birds, students quickly
respond to reward incentives and soon learn to touch lightly upon any other assigned
material, perhaps skipping it altogether. Some are so candid as to ask us point blank
whether they must do the other assigned reading."
Regarding the tenor ofclassroom discussion, today's classroom dialogue seems to
indicate that the cases are held in less awe than in yesteryear. Certainly, legal
scholars no longer speak the language of Langdellian high formalism. But budding
lawyers do not spring fully-matured, Athena-like, from the pages of law reviews.
They come from society at large, which still holds a simplistic view of the legal
system and speaks of the "rule of law" as though it is a cross between a religious
talisman and a stop sign: all-powerful and pure, yet easy to see and understand.
Each fall, we should not be as surprised as we are to find beginning students
expecting to be taught "the law" as though our task was merely to wheel stone tablets
into the classroom.
The new law student often, perhaps usually, arrives with a mindset akin to what
Roscoe Pound called "mechanical jurisprudence."'" Law is largely viewed as a set
of rules to be learned and then applied, something like the declension of verbs. But
as soon as the rules are challenged or the application becomes exacting, this
conception of law fails them. All it takes is a few "whys?" such as, "Why shouldn't
a manufacturer be liable for personal injuries caused by its product irrespective of
any contractual relationship with the injured party?" or, "Why shouldn't a promise
in an advertisement generally be treated as an offer?" Too many students reply to
19. See LAURAKALMAN, LEGAL REALISMATYALE, 1927-1960, at 92 (1986); Jeffrey W.Stempel,
All Stressed Up But Not Sure Where to Go: Ponderingthe Teaching ofAdversarialism in Law School,
BROOK. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (1989) (reviewing STEPHAN A. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON
ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988)).

55

20. Although this often punctures our balloon of holding oracular status in the eyes of students,
we usually resist the tendency to reply with a snappy Don Rickles/Richard Lewis type answer, such
as, "No, we just assigned it to make sure we get kickbacks from the publisher," or "No, this is just part
of our way of testing your ability to separate the wheat from the chaff." Eventually, again like
Skinner's birds, we learn to make occasional reference in class to the assigned reading to fend off such
questions.
21. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose ofSociologicalJurisprudence,25 HARv. L. REv.
489, 489-95 (1912).
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such queries with some variation of "Because that's the law." This, obviously, will
not do. To grasp what will do, to transcend tautology, to get beyond the bare text of
cases and statutes, they must understand what generates and sustains the law.
Ironically, the new students' mechanistic view of the law often accompanies an
incipient legal realism. When the veneer of a case is pierced, their first response may
be to label all inconsistency with precedent, internal difficulty, or perceived
unfairness as the result of personnel on the court, shifting political winds of the
Harris Poll variety, or personal quirks of the bench. To the extent it reduces the new
students' excessive credulity, this is progress of sorts. However, it misses a key
aspect and, for us, the most interesting, edifying aspect of the art and politics of law.
It overlooks the differing, quite defensible intellectual and value orientations within
and across societies over time.
It seems clear to us that despite the progress of legal education in the twentieth
century, too many students are simply not sufficiently versed in the currents
energizing the law to intelligently delve much beyond the superficiality of the black
letter. That is the bad news. Most of us (old-timers) were in the same boat. The
good news is that law students, like everyone else, perform better when given the
right equipment. With a basic grounding in the law's undercurrents (law school is
not too late for this), we have found that students become better consumers of law.
They are able to retain and use the law more effectively while evaluating the legal
products with greater sophistication, thereby being better prepared to become law
producers as well. At least, this is our wholly unbiased perception based on the
essentially traditional and case-dominated courses we have taught (i.e., civil
procedure, contracts, insurance, professional responsibility, property, torts, and legal
process).
Although one of the heartening developments in modern legal education is a
proliferation of different types of courses and teaching styles, we do not believe this
diversity undermines our call for greater use of multidisciplinary foundational
grounding and analysis. Indeed, it may work in the opposite direction. To begin
with, as noted above, variations of the case method continue to be the focus and
fulcrum of legal education. Even in required courses using nontraditional methods,
cases still usually form the core of the material though the students may be engaged
in practicum activities. Primary authorities also retain their places outside the basic
required courses, even in many seminars. But these courses are just as amenable to
improvement when students have better tools for processing the legal data. For
example, jurisprudential writings assigned in a seminar are as much in need of
foundational analysis as are appellate cases. John Rawls,' Robert Nozick, 3 Ronald
Dworkin,24 Catherine MacKinnon,' Richard Posner,26 and Patricia Williams" are as

22. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLs, ATIEORYOFJUSTICE (1971).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1975).
24. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW (1996); RONALD DWoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
25. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
26. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafater
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCEI; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).

27.

See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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29
subject to scrutiny as are Marburyv. Madison,28 Hawkins v. McGee, Pennoyer v.
3' Just like leading cases, acclaimed scholars can
30
Neff, or The Wagon Mound Cases.
be better understood, appreciated, and even criticized by students who have grasped
the undercurrents of the law.
Other nontraditional approaches to legal education are also susceptible to
multidisciplinary strengthening. Clinics, simulations, research and writing, advanced
advocacy, as well as the problem method mentioned above, are among those that
would be enriched by a broad perspective. Ethical, economic, political,
governmental, structural, historical, sociological, psychological, and jurisprudential
currents energize the law from top to bottom, side to side, inside and out. Because
alternative approaches to teaching the law must still confront the law itself, one must
ultimately grasp the same roots to gain deep understanding from any direction.
32
Whatever the final reception of documents such as the MacCrate 33Report, which
many have read as a call for substantial revisions to legal education, that reception
is unlikely to alter legal education so as to diminish the importance of the
foundational concepts. Well into the twenty-first century, legal education will still
focus on cases, statutes, scholarship, and disputes. Law is both a product and a
source of such matter. Even though the modern law school classroom has changed,
and will continue to do so, the need for an enriched basis for student understanding
remains.

28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). This is the memorable "hairy hand" case immortalized in
Osbourne's PaperChase and featured in several casebooks.
30. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). This was a controlling case at one time, now advancing an almost extinct
view ofpersonal jurisdiction, reprinted in virtually every civil procedure casebook. See, e.g., RICHARD
L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 667 (2d ed. 1995); JOHN J. COUND ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 65 (6th ed. 1993). Well, this may not be a completely
extinct view. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,638-39 (1990) (holding personal service
of process on defendant within forum state satisfies due process despite defendant's limited contact
with forum state).
31. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound (No. I)),
I App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co. (The Wagon
Mound (No. 2)), 1 App. Cas. 617 (P.C. 1967). These mid-20th century Australian cases on the
proximate cause element of negligence are found in many torts casebooks. See, e g., EPSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 531-42 (6th ed. 1995); WADE, supra note 12, at 297-304.
32. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].

33. To some extent, we disagree that the MacCrate Report is a clarion call for massive reform.
Good law teaching, even in the large classroom setting, has already been imparting the skills and values
endorsed in the MacCrate Report. To the extent the MacCrate Report recommends more hands-on,
task-specific legal education designed to build skills and professional judgment, it obviously seeks
some shift from traditional classroom teaching to smaller practicum style classes, simulations, and
clinics, as well as more emphasis on legal writing and research. But even aggressive implementation
of such a system seems to involve not so much a radical revision as an extension of existing
educational efforts. Doing it the MacCrate way, however, would probably require a student-faculty
ratio thought too luxurious by most law schools.
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The FoundationalConcepts

In Foundationsof the Law, we discuss in a brief and simplified fashion six major
areas of background information directly affecting law. In our view, this material is
sufficiently central to understanding law and the legal system as to comprise a
minimum "legal literacy" for law students.34 We hope to avoid the impression that
we encourage rote memorization of it by students. Law school is not a three-year
version of "Jeopardy" or "The $64,000 Question" (although knowing facts worked
pretty well for the young Dr. Joyce Brothers as a contestant). Rather, we encourage
students to master enough truly essential background material to be astute and
discriminating processors of the legal information pouring down on them in law
school. While ideally students (and faculty) should be masters of a vast body of
knowledge about society and its values, legal education can only provide so much.
We believe legal education should, at a minimum, provide an introduction to the
most basic and useful building blocks for law study. These topics, in our opinion,
are: ethics, economics, political theory, government structure, dispute resolution and
the adversary system, and jurisprudence as reflecting the zeitgeist. We will not
summarize these topics here for we believe the reader is generally acquainted with
them and, if desired, can examine our book and others for expositions. Instead, we
will point out many of the highlights of the topics by raising them in context.
II. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF A FAMOUS CATHEDRAL: MACPHERSON v. BUICK
MOTOR CO.

Closely examining a particular case with the tools of multidisciplinary analysis will
illustrate the degree to which increased understanding may flow from broadened
foundational knowledge. The case chosen, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,"
authored by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, is a classic of the tort-warranty-contract
interface in products liability law. Because of Cardozo's mastery of putting new
wine in old skins, MacPhersonreads largely like a routine application of established
precedent to somewhat varied facts. But close analysis, using multidisciplinary
considerations, reveals MacPhersonto be a far-reaching landmark. It provides an
opening for class discussion of the larger debate about legal liability and, indeed,
about the law and the legal process itself. Like the revelations from Monet's
paintings at different times of the facade of Rouen Cathedral,36 scrutinizing
MacPhersonfrom a range of perspectives highlights different facets of the decision.

34.

See E.D. HmSCH, JR., CULTURAL LTERAcY 146, 152-219 (1987) (listing people, events,

scientific terms and literature that culturally literate Americans should know). We further address the
relation of Hirsch's conception of core knowledge to law's foundations in our TEACHER'S MANUAL,
supra note 9, at 2-5.
35.

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).

36. We echo, of course, the article by Calabresi and Melamed that examines legal entitlements
according to the nature of the entitlement. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, LiabilityRules and Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1127-28

(1972).
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MacPherson: The FirstQuiet Revolution in Products Liability

Donald MacPherson purchased a Buick automobile from a local dealer. "One of
the wheels was made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments" as
the car "suddenly collapsed" and MacPherson "was thrown out and injured."37
MacPherson sued Buick for personal injuries. Buick argued that, since it had not
sold the car directly to MacPherson, the parties were not in privity of contract and,
therefore, it was free of liability. In addition, Buick noted that the wheel had been
made by a subcontractor, and that this also should insulate Buick from liability, even
though, according to the court, there was evidence that the wheel's "defects could
have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and that inspection was omitted."38
'
There was no claim that Buick "knew of the defect and willfully concealed it."39
The plaintiff did not advance his claim as one of fraud or warranty. Rather,
MacPhersonwas a "simple" negligence case presenting the difficult issue of whether
a manufacturer is liable to a consumer for a defective product when there is no privily
between them. The general rule in New York and other states, stemming from the
leading case ofSeixas v. Woods,' which embraced the doctrine of caveat emptor, and
was influenced by the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,4 was that producers
were not liable for negligence to third parties. 2 This was because, under the later
reasoning of courts, the producers' "conduct, though negligent, was not likely to
result in injury to any one except the purchaser." 3 Cardozo's majority opinion, while
suggesting that England had backed away from this strict view," rested its finding
for MacPherson on existing New York case law that recognized an exception for
certain dangerous products to the rule barring producer liability in the absence of
privity." s
The New York Court of Appeals paid obeisance to the doctrine of Winterbottom
in Thomas v. Winchester,' even though the doctrine was declared inapplicable under
the particular facts of Thomas.47 Plaintiff Thomas and his wife prevailed in their
claims against a drug manufacturer that had affixed an erroneous, misleading label
to a poisonous product. The product was ultimately sold to Thomas via a middleman
37. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
41.
42.
43.

152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
111 N.E. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) (citing 2 COOLEY ON TORTS 1486 (3d ed. 1906)).
Id. at 1051.

44. Id. at 1052-53. Cardozo cited the more recent British case of Heaven v. Pender, L.R., 11
Q.B.D. 503, 510 (1883), which he read as suggesting that England now employs reasonable
foreseeability of use by the plaintiff as its touchstone for imposing a duty of due care.
45. MacPherson received a favorable jury verdict at trial, which was affirmed by the appellate
division, 145 N.Y.S. 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), before being affirmed by the Court of Appeals per

Cardozo's opinion. Consequently, the case posture and underlying notions of civil procedure and
adversarialism provided powerful support to MacPherson. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43;
infra text accompanying notes 111-158.

46. 6N.Y. 397 (1852).
47. In Thomas, "[c]ases were cited by way of illustration in which manufacturers were not subject
to any duty irrespective of contract." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11l N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y.

1916).
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and a druggist, and consumed by his wife. Cardozo read Thomas as embracing an
exception to the rule of Winterbottom requiring privity because ofthe extreme danger
caused by negligently passing off a deadly poison, which was difficult to discern, as
a harmless drug."u In his characterization of Thomas, Cardozo authored the analysis
that relegated the traditional rule to anachronistic status. Indeed, mislabeled poisons
are foreseeably dangerous to ultimate consumers and users, as are the products that
later cases found to fall within the Thomas exception to Winterbottom, but in this day
and age, so are a vast number of other products. Further reducing the reach of the
traditional rule of Winterbottom, or expanding its exception in Thomas,49 Cardozo
added that "[w]e are not required to say whether the chance of injury was always as
remote as the distinction assumes. Some of the illustrations [from cases rebuffing the
Thomas exception] might be rejected today."5
Cardozo then launched upon a tour of the dangerous product exception to the
general rule of Winterbottom." In doing so, Cardozo expressly sought to give
readers the view that the law is moving inexorably, though not linearly, toward
dismantling the citadel of privity for liability in negligence, noting that more recent
cases "evince a more liberal spirit" of finding their facts to fall within the exception
to the rule.52 He discussed liability found without privity where the offending items
were a scaffold, 3 a coffee urn,' 4 aerated water,"5 a defective building,56 an elevator, 7
and a defective rope. 8 The reader is subtly persuaded that an automobile has at least
as much potential for danger and destruction as these items.59 Rejecting the "verbal
niceties" of distinctions based on whether the product is "inherently" or
"imminently" dangerous (i.e., whether dangerous in all events or merely dangerous
when defective), Cardozo summarized the court's holding by saying that the
exception to the privily defense is no longer to be "limited to poisons, explosives, and
things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are implements of
48. Id. at 1051.
49. Cardozo's holding conforms to his later observation: "Hardly a rule of today but may be
matched by its opposite of yesterday." BENJAMINN. CARDOzO, THENATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
26(1921).
50. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.

51. He also explained away the precedential force of some of the cases following the general rule.
See, e.g., id. at 1052 (discussing the "criticised" case of Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873), and

"confin[ing it] to its special facts" because, contrary to the facts of MacPherson,the vendor knew that
the purchaser had tested the defective boiler in question).
52. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.

53. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
54. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909).

55. Torgeson v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1908).
56. Burke v. Ireland, 50 N.Y.S. 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).

57. Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
58. Davies v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 20 N.Y.S. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892), ajfd without
opinion, 41 N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1895).

59. Cardozo made this point explicit a page later: "Beyond all question, the nature of an
automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective. This automobile was

designed to go 50 miles an hour. Unless its wheels were sound and strong, injury was almost certain."
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11l N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). However, Cardozo left it to
Chief Justice Bartlett to point out indissent that at the time of the incident the automobile was traveling
only 8 miles an hour. See id. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting).
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destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."' Of course,
as subsequent litigation has shown, and as Cardozo must have suspected, virtually
every negligently made product (even children's toys,6 kitchen appliances,' and
clothing63) can be a danger to life and limb under certain circumstances.
Cardozo then clothed in a garb of moderation what essentially amounts to the
court's conversion of the exception into the rule, saying MacPherson's victory is "as
far as we are required to go for the decision of this case."' Then, he set out the
ground rules for the new era:
There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. It is possible
to use almost anything in a way that will make it dangerous if defective. That is not
enough to charge the manufacturer with a duty independent of his contract. Whether
a given thing is dangerous may be sometimes a question for the court and sometimes
a question for the jury. There must also be knowledge that in the usual course of events
the danger will be shared by others than the buyer. Such knowledge may often be
inferred from the nature of the transaction. But it is possible that even knowledge of
the danger and of the use will not always be enough. The proximity or remoteness of
the relation is a factor to be considered.65
At this point, Cardozo delivered his most memorable rhetoric and the denouement
of the issue, but buried it in the middle of the majority opinion. He chose a tortbased scheme of product injury compensation and "closed the sale" on his argument
that the modem age requires modification of the traditional reverence for contractual
privily:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.
We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source
in the law.
[Buick] would have us say that [the dealer] was the one person whom it was under a
legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion.
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of
travel to-day. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the
60. Id.
at 1053.
61. See, e.g., Milton Bradley Co. v. Cooper, 53 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (toy torpedo);
Lugo v. LJN Toys, Ltd., 552 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 1990) (detachable part of a toy doll); Gittelson v.
Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 42 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) (toy with spring holding a
rotator).
62. See, e.g., Roettig v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1944)
(electric stove); Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 6 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1936) (coffee urn); Nash v.
General Electric Co., 410 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (toaster oven).
63. See, e.g., Carterv. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (flammable
dress); Bighan v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978) (flammable work clothes); Sherman
v. Lowenstein & Sons, 282 N.YS.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (flammable pajamas).
64. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
65. Id.
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things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a
developing civilization require them to be. 66
Cardozo observed that English law had also moved against the sacrosanct privity

of Winterbottom, 67 and noted in conclusory terms that Buick in particular was fairly
subjected to liability since it was not a mere conduit of component parts. As an
automobile manufacturer, "[it was responsible for the finished product. It was not
at liberty to put the finished product on the market without subjecting the component
parts to ordinary and simple tests."6

One can imagine why MacPherson has been described as "the quietest of
revolutionary manifestos, the least unsettling to conservative professional
sensibilities" as a consequence of its "pretend[ing] to be restating rather than

changing the law." 9 But Cardozo's skillful rhetoric can hardly be called a massive
deception. Chief Justice Bartlett's loud dissent pointed out that the majority holding

was more than a mere extension or fine-tuning of precedent, but instead abrogated
the general rule and changed a doctrine widely accepted across the United States.7"
No other judge joined his dissenting vote to absolve Buick of liability. Although it
is possible that none of the other four participating judges saw through Cardozo's
smokescreen, this is unlikely. They were experienced jurists, not credulous ciphers.

The court knew what it was doing.
Cardozo's skillful treatment may have made the holding a less tempting target for

opponents (presumably manufacturers, insurers, and political conservatives," this
being a group well represented in the halls of power), but it was not a stealth bomb.
More likely, the court and the legal community had a pretty good idea of the

decision's impact,' but were drawn by Cardozo's analysis because the dissent failed
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1054.
68. Id. at 1055.
69. POSNER, supra note 14, at 109. Since then, of course, products liability law has expanded
enormously, but largely under a theory not signaled in MacPherson. While this leading case was based
on negligence, current products liability law centers on warranty (contract). There may be a second
silent revolution favoring the curtailment of manufacturer liability. See James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, Inside the Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992).
70. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11l N.E. 1050, 1055-57 (N.Y. 1916).
71. But would all types of political conservatives have opposed the majority ruling? We think
our taxonomy illuminates this issue as well. See infra text accompanying notes 108-109.
72. MacPhersonwas identified by the New York Times as a significant decision within days of
its release on March 14, 1916. See Editorial, A Decision of Wide Application, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16,
1916, at 12 ("There will be a somewhat apprehensive interest among the owners of more than one great
industry in the decision just rendered by the New York Court of Appeals in regard to the
responsibilities resting on the manufacturers of automobiles.... The rule thus laid down is evidently
of wide applicability."); Holds Makers Liable: Court ofAppeals Establishes New Rule in Automobile
Case, N.Y. TIMiEs, Mar. 15, 1916, at 4 ("Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, who wrote the prevailing
opinion, diverged from the early decisions of the courts in this State and refused to follow the rulings
of the United States Circuit Court in actions of a similar nature."). Even without the immediate press
coverage, MacPhersonwas, of course, a reported opinion by the highest court of a large and important
urbanized state with a substantial and sophisticated bar. Not surprisingly, MacPherson began to be
cited and deferred to rather rapidly. Within six months, an intermediate appellate opinion cited
MacPhersonand applied its reasoning to sustain a products liability theory against the manufacturer
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to offer a principled argument against the decision. The gist of Chief Justice
Bartlett's entire objection is that Cardozo is changing the common law. Although
that argument may have been more persuasive in the pre-realist era of 1916, it is a
weak protest in modem times. The current view is that "[i]t is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry

IV."73 Worse yet for Bartlett, the precedent of Winterbottom was not all that recent
or irresistibly correct. Three-quarters of a century of dominance is a pretty
impressive run, but it falls far short of a rule with roots in Roman law.
Cardozo was right about the large number of exceptions or, perhaps, the single,
very large exception. Critics have also ascribed the privily rule and other defenses
to the needs of the capitalistic entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution. 4 Even in
1916, judges must have sensed the shifting social ground wrought by labor unrest,
immigration, populist attacks on the business order, trust busting (by Republicans,
no less), and the Woodrow Wilson presidency, all of which suggested that the
business establishment's control over national affairs might be slipping. But
MacPherson is hardly a radical manifesto, a factor that probably accounts for its

acceptance, but relatively uneventful incorporation, into the law.75

of a ladder, a device considerably less powerful than an automobile. See Miller v. Steinfeld, 160
N.Y.S. 800, 802-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916). The Miller court not only was aware of MacPherson,but
also used the prominence of the decision against plaintiff's counsel in dismissing the claim for failure
to adequately prove the identity of the purported ladder manufacturer. See id. at 803 (stating plaintiffs
counsel was "unquestionably familiar" with the MacPherson decision).
Three months later, a different intermediate court unanimously affirmed without opinion a claim
against a different ladder manufacturer on the "authority" of MacPherson. See Magnusson v. Long
Island Ladder & Scaffold Co., 162 N.Y.S. 1129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916). Simultaneously, counsel were
citing MacPhersonas authority before the Court of Appeals, indicating that attorneys with pending
tort matters had immediately seized upon the significance of MacPherson. See O'Connor v. Weber,
114 N.E. 799, 800 (N.Y. 1916) (rejecting the respondent's reliance on MacPherson to argue that a
meat grinder should have had a hand guard, the Court of Appeals per Cardozo finds the existing design
adequately safe as a matter of law.). Within a year, a lower court invoked MacPhersonto find a simple
loaf of bread subject to the MacPherson"rule" when the bread contained a nail that broke two teeth
of the consumer. See Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co., 163 N.Y.S. 396, 397 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1916).
Infant formula received the same treatment. See Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 168 N.Y.S. 505,
507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917).
MacPhersonwas sufficiently prominent that the Second Circuit reversed itself on a product claim
in view of MacPhersonover a strong dissent invoking res judicata as a bar to the application of
MacPherson,no matter how persuasive. See Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 F. 878, 886 (2d
Cir. 1919). In a decade, other jurisdictions were referring to MacPhersonas a "leading" case. See,
e.g., Martin v. Studebaker Corp., 133 A. 384, 385 (N.J. 1926).
73. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
74. See, e.g., P.S. ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CorrTRACT 467 (1979) (indicating
the adoption of the caveat emptor doctrine is an example of the rejection of the "older moralistic ideas"
of contract law said to be "outmoded" in the "new political economy" of the early nineteenth century);
LAWRENCE M. FRiDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 262-63 (1973) (noting in the nineteenth
century, "[tihe law developed in a way . .. considered socially desirable ... [by] fram[ing] rules
friendly to the growth of young businesses.... The rules put limits on enterprise liability").
75. Part of MacPherson's appeal lies in the limits of its new rule, which generally favored
claimants but still provided substantial protections to manufacturers. Many cases citing MacPherson
as a recently decided case used it to limit manufacturer liability. See, e.g., O'Connor, 114 N.E. at 800
(stating despite respondent's reliance on MacPhersonto argue that a meatgrinder should have a hand
guard, the Court of Appeals per Cardozo rejects the argument and finds the existing design adequately
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With perfect hindsight, the fall of the citadel of privity seems inevitable. Or is this
misleading? Was the outcome of this doctrinal battle really so clear cut? The
MacPherson opinion stands out as a wonderful example of judicial craft and
doctrinal evolution, and has been oft-examined by these criteria.76 But one of the
amazing things about the opinion is its bare-bones justification. Cardozo relied on
the erratic precedential movement toward curbing the restrictions of privity and
virtually nothing else. As we shall see, many other bases were available to him, as
were available to objectors.
B.

Examining MacPherson by FoundationalFactors

To suggest the riches of case analyses that invoke the full range of
multidisciplinary factors, in this section we point down the roads that Cardozo
declined to take in MacPherson because he found a simple path-what he calls "the
rule of analogy" 77-sufficient to get him where he wanted to go. We say "point

down the roads" because we will not take these roads ourselves. Instead, we will
raise "well-placed 'whys?"' that direct the respondent to travel down the roads in

search of replies, although, some of our questions are admittedly quite leading. In
anticipation of instructors' hypotheticals that push the question of liability past the
issue in MacPherson,many of the queries we raise go beyond the particulars of this

case. For those who desire more detailed directions, we recommend our road map,
Foundationsof the Law, which charts the terrain we are about to survey indirectly.
1.

Ethical Theory and ProductsLiability Law78

Utilitarianism.Would a utilitarian, who elevates the good or utility above justice
(i.e., seeks above all the best state of affairs), find overall social benefits in a rule that
safe as a matter of law); Licari v. Markotos, 180 N.Y.S. 278, 280 (N.Y. App. Term 1920) (noting
MacPherson requires that the plaintiff demonstrate the defendant's lack of care, existence of a defect,
and the defendant's failure to discover the defect); Rosenfeld v. Albert Smith & Son, 168 N.Y.S. 214,
220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (declaring that MacPherson is inapplicable where component-maker had
no reason to believe there would not be further inspections of a device and expected testing of it by the
purchaser); Tipton v. Bamard & Leas Mfg. Co., 257 S.W. 791, 797 (Mo. 1924) (indicating the sale
of a package of parts to be assembled does not give rise to a products liability claim when the
assembling purchaser is injured by a defect).
Cardozo himself cited MacPherson both to impose liability and to foreclose it. Compare
Rosebrook v. General Elec. Co., 140 N.E. 571, 574 (N.Y. 1923) (imposing liability on manufacturer)
and Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922) (imposing liability for losses caused by
defective scales) with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,445 (N.Y. 1931) (finding no liability
for accountant to third parties absent privity, despite MacPherson rule) and H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928) (finding no liability for water supplier when
water delivery failure impedes firefighting). Although both products liability and professional liability
expanded later in the twentieth century, MacPherson appears to have been viewed in its era as
expanding, but not tearing, the fabric of legal liability.
76. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEvi, AN INTRoDucnoN TO LEGAL REASONNG 9-25 (1948), KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DEcIDING APPEALS 430-37 (1960); POSNER, supranote
14, at 107-09.
77.
78.

See infra note 87.
See generally KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, ch. I (Ethical Theory and the Law).
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allows parties not in privity to recover in negligence from producers for personal
injuries caused by dangerous, defective products? Why would liability give rise to
utility gains?79
0 Although the consumers or users of the products, or the injured bystanders, along
with all their family, friends and supporters, would gain wealth and other value from
a recovery, is this offset by the losses to the producer as well as its employees,
shareholders, suppliers, and their supporters?
* What would be the overall effect on commerce of such a rule? If detrimental, should
the injured few be sacrificed for the benefit of society in general? How is this tradeoff to be measured?
* Is it relevant that those on the losing side may generally be wealthier than those on
the winning side? What if the particular case is an exception to this generalization?
* Would a utilitarian like J.S. Mill, who favors the promotion of justice because it
gives people satisfaction," find that justice is advanced by the rule in MacPherson?
Would a Millian endorse the rule because, pursuant to the "harm principle,""1 the
injury to MacPherson is seen as an "other-regarding" harm created by Buick and,
therefore, sanctionable?
While the court is to resolve the dispute before it by properly considering the
individual merits, as in act utilitarianism, how is it to accommodate the generalized
concerns that follow from the principle of stare decisis that establishes precedent for
materially indistinguishable cases, as in rule utilitarianism?
* Is it better to avoid the rule-utilitarian type of broad principles regarding products
liability, and stick to the act-utilitarian type of narrow rules or subrules that
encompass only a constricted characterization of the material facts of the case before
the court?
* In addressing this last question, is the practice of broadly or narrowly characterizing
a means of finessing or reinforcing the choice to adopt broad or
the material facts
2
narrow rules?

* Is Cardozo's view of these issues apparent in MacPherson from his methodical
discussion of the precedents?
Speaking of good and bad, better and worse, what is the nature of the good to be
considered when confronting these liability questions? Happiness? Efficiency?
Virtue? Siblinghood? Solidarity? Preference satisfaction? How do these differ in
this context?

79. The economic effects of products liability is taken up in the next section, Products Liability
Law and Economics.
80. See KuKLrI & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 56-57.
81. Seeid at57.
82. This line of inquiry suggests the Aristotlean mandate ofjustice to treat like cases alike and
different cases differently. When are cases alike or different?
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Are there benefits to the judicial system from the adoption of a general rule of
liability, rather than a narrower rule with substantial exceptions? What are these
benefits? What are the trade-offs?
" Does the judicial system benefit from the preservation of the privity rule by
discouraging litigation and, thereby, reducing the workload of the courts?
" If so, is this benefit to the taxpayers offset by the losses to individual claimants? By
losses to society from the decrease in deterrence that follows from the reduced
liability of producers? If the concern is the social costs of litigation, should court
fees be raised to cover actual costs?
Kantianism. Would a Kantian, who subordinates the good or utility to justice (i.e.,
places supreme value on doing the right thing), find a rule just that allows parties not
in privity to recover in negligence from producers for personal injuries caused by
dangerous, defective products? Is it rational to universalize such a liability rule?
" Is it relevant whether the producer could "foresee" the risk to the claimant? If so,
how foreseeable must the risk be?
" Should it make a difference whether the harm was personal injury rather than
property damage?
Has the injured party been deceived by the producer's assertions of safety, express
or implied, as from advertisements? If so, what is wrong with deception in general,
or this type of deception in particular?
0 Did the claimant rely on the deception (i.e., how would the injured party have acted
differently in the absence of the assertions)? Should reliance be required for a
cognizable claim?
Did the producer expressly or implicitly promise the injured party that the product
was without defect, or, if defective, that it would compensate for injuries? Did the
claimant pay consideration for this promise? Should consideration be required in
these situations, or should the claimant's reliance on the promise suffice? If so, what
was the reliance?
* If the producer explicitly disclaimed any warranty or other liability, should this
trump any implied promise to the contrary?
* Is it fair to require the producer to "insure" against product harms, its contrary
intention notwithstanding, as a necessary cost of being a producer?
* In such cases, how important is the principle of freedom from contract? Is it relevant
that the roar of advertisements may drown out the whisper of a contractual
disclaimer clause? If so, when is the roar loud enough? Should parties unfamiliar
with the contract, such as injured bystanders, be bound by its terms?
Hybrid Theories and "All Things Considered." Insofar as utilitarian and Kantian
considerations are in conflict over the circumstances in which a producer should be
liable for product injuries, how is this conflict to be resolved?
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* Is there a common scale on which these considerations can be commensurate? If
not, is the court left without the moral guidance needed to determine close cases?
" What other sources or factors may be looked to for guidance? History? Economics?
The personal likes and dislikes of the judge? Whether one party is generally a "good
guy" and the other is a "bad guy" and, therefore, deserves to recover or to
compensate?
" How "good" or "bad" are MacPherson and Buick? In what way is a fact finder to
determine this? How much relative weight is to be given each of these factors?
DistributiveJustice. Speaking of good guys and bad guys, how is this quality to
be determined? By what standard is their "desert" to be measured? Did MacPherson
do anything to "deserve" his injury, or did Buick do anything to "deserve" its
liability?
* Insofar as the liability of Buick negatively affects its profitability or even viability,
do Buick's employees, suppliers, retailers, and shareholders, as well as their families
and supporters, deserve to suffer?
* Does the great effort or labor of Buick in establishing a successful enterprise earn
it freedom from liability in this case? Should Buick be exculpated because of the
enterprise's substantial contribution to the general welfare of society? Or does
Buick owe more to society because it reaped disproportionately the blessings of
liberty and the benefits of the social infrastructure created by others, including prior
generations?
* Does MacPherson's comparative neediness deserve protection? Or does Buick's
substantial wealth obligate it beyond the norm? Is it relevant that Buick may "feel"
the monetary loss less than MacPherson would "feel" the monetary gain? What is
to be made of MacPherson's and Buick's relative social rank?
* What other material conceptions ofjustice may be invoked to measure the relative
"desert" of the parties?
* If these standards of desert come into conflict, how are they to be balanced? Can
fact finders accurately discern and measure the desert of the parties? Will fact
finders simply make such determinations based on their own biases?
* Should the redistribution of wealth be a governmental function? If so, in the context
of a private lawsuit? Historically, doesn't this kind of governmental power lead to
corruption, because of the incompetence, foibles, malice, etc., of the government
agents? Are the doleful lessons of the Soviet Union, whereby wealth was to be
distributed under the Marxist maxim, "from each according to ability, to each
according to need," transferable to a liberal democracy?
* If wealth is to be redistributed by the organs of government, is it accomplished better
through the more democratic legislative process, as in tax and spend measures?
Corrective Justice. Does the liability of Buick reflect Aristotle's notion of
corrective justice whereby a blameworthy actor is to compensate a party she injures?
In light of the fact that Buick purchased the defective wheel from a reputable supplier
that had not previously furnished a faulty one, was Buick blameworthy? Under these
circumstances, is the failure of Buick to examine or test each wheel blameworthy?
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" If Buick's conduct was blameworthy, to what extent? To the extent of the damages

*
*
"

*

recovered by MacPherson? If the blameworthiness equates to a monetary rate less
than the recovered compensation, has Buick 83simply been used by society or
MacPherson as a means to its or his own ends?
But in this situation of blameless conduct by MacPherson, should he be obliged to
absorb his excess losses above Buick's blameworthiness? Why?
If Buick's blameworthiness is commensurately greater than MacPherson's recovery,
has Buick failed to pay its due?
To step back a moment, does the negligence standard of tort liability actually track
the Aristotlean notion of corrective justice? Does strict liability, as under a products
liability warranty claim, track Aristotle's position, or, at least, track it better than
does a recovery in negligence?
What other plausible standards of corrective justice exist? In formal terms of
corrective justice, what is the most accurate characterization of the standard of
negligence? Strict liability?

Does the traditionally sharp theoretical distinction between the notions of
corrective and distributive justice fail to account for an overlapping that courts
implicitly recognize, especially in certain types of cases such as those involving
products liability?
" In general, does the principled recognition or factual application of some common
law doctrines, justified in the name of corrective justice, actually attempt to address

historical maldistributions of property and wealth?"
* In the context of MacPherson, does or should the disposition to find enterprise

liability stem partially from an intergenerational corrective principle aimed at the
beneficiaries of the corporate octopi of the nineteenth century who, as reported by
the muckrakers, often accumulated great wealth by practicing a gross overreaching
that included force, fraud, advantage-taking, and exploitation?
" Does the long run of the privity defense reflect this dominating influence of
enterprises on the legal system?"5
* Again, if this is all true, should or can the common law courts or even the legislature

properly make the necessary corrective judgments? What should they be?
Feminist Moral Theory and Communitarianism. Are the relative equities of
MacPherson and Buick properly resolved under the common law practice of fully
granting either the claim of the plaintiff or the defense of the defendant?

83. Some of society's likely ends (e.g., economic considerations) are taken up in the next section.
84. Among the claimed wholesale maldistributions are the property rights originating from
inequitable or neglected treaties with Native Americans and what some claim were U.S. wars of
aggression (e.g., the Spanish-American war).
85. The leading case, as discussed above, is Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
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" Since the equities are rarely univocal, as in MacPherson where substantial
arguments support both sides, should the court implement compromises that
accommodate the relative merits of both parties' positions, similar to the sharing of
losses under the principle of comparative negligence?
* For that matter, should the legal system forcefully resist litigated solutions to
disputes altogether and pressure the parties into settling them by face-to-face
compromise, as in mediation? Even if Buick had no legal responsibility for
MacPherson's personal injuries, should it have offered him some compensation
because he was an unfortunate victim of circumstances stemming from Buick's
product through no fault of his own?
* As a member of Buick's larger community, and as a person with whom it established
an indirect relationship through a chain of contracts linking the producer to the
consumer, shouldn't MacPherson be looked upon by Buick as one to be aided rather
than one to be defied, legal rights notwithstanding?
* On the other hand, since, among other reasons, Buick's blameworthiness was slight
and its contribution to society is great, should MacPherson, for the sake of fraternity
and solidarity, temper his claim for complete compensation? Should he write off,
at least partially, his injury as a cost of living in modem society?
Ethics and the Legal Process. In a case such as MacPherson,which effectively
brought down the citadel of privity in negligence claims for products liability, is it
incumbent on Cardozo to address the normative trade-offs at stake rather than simply
rely on a "survey of the decisions?"' In other words, instead of exclusive reliance

on the formalism of what he calls "the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy,"
whereby "[t]he directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical
progression," should Cardozo have looked beyond the "mass of particulars [and] a
congeries ofjudgments on related topics," to the instrumentalism of his "method of

sociology," the dominating method in his view, which brings to bear "the directive
force of a principle.., along the lines ofjustice, morals and social welfare, the mores
of the day?"87

86. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
87. These quotations come from Cardozo's discussion of the approaches "to fix[ing] the bounds
and the tendencies of development and growth [of a legal principle], to set[ting] the directive force in
motion along the right path at the parting of the ways." CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 30. He introduced
the four methods:
The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical progression; this
I will call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy; along the line of historical
development; this I will call the method of evolution; along the line of the customs of the
community; this I will call the method of tradition; along the lines ofjustice, morals and social
welfare, the mores of the day; and this I will call the method of sociology.
Id. at 30-31. The first approach, the method of philosophy, is as follows: "Given a mass of particulars,
a congeries of judgments on related topics, the principle that unifies and rationalizes them has a
tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend itself to new cases within the limits of its capacity
to unify and rationalize." Id. at 31. As evidenced by the decision, Cardozo believed this first approach
sufficient to resolve the issue in MacPherson. Apparently the method of philosophy points only in this
one direction, because, particularly when the directive force of logic points in more than one direction,
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0 For the edification of the public and the bar, and to discipline judges less gifted than
Cardozo, is normative guidance mandated? For that matter, shouldn't even Cardozo,
The Great One, have disciplined himself by detailed consideration of the underlying
policies to shorten his ultimate normative leap of faith as much as possible, since his
own record of judicial decisionmaking was not flawless?"

2.

Products Liability Law and Economics89

The Basic Elements. Is permitting the privity defense more efficient than
abrogating it or limiting it to "safe" products unlikely to injure third parties?"
there must be "the constant checking and testing of philosophy by justice, and of justice by
philosophy." Id. at 44.
One of the interesting aspects of MacPhersonis that Cardozo did not resort to support by, or
consider objections derived from, any of the other three methods of directing the evolution of the legal
principle at stake. Under the second one, the method of evolution, "[tihe tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic may be counteracted [or supplemented] by the tendency to confine
itself within the limits of its history." Id. at 51. There was no counteraction or supplementation in
MacPherson,or at least, none to be expressed. "Which [of the two] method [s]will predominate in any
case, may depend at times upon intuitions of convenience or fitness too subtle to be formulated, too
at 58.
imponderable to be valued, too volatile to be localized or even fully apprehended." Id.
Under the third method, the method of tradition, custom has less "creative energy" than in days
gone by. Id. at 59. "It is... not so much in the making of new rules as in the application of old ones
that the creative energy of custom most often manifests itself today. General standards of right and
at 62. In MacPherson,the old standards of right and duty are disestablished.
duty are established." Id.
This must be why Cardozo avoided the method of tradition. But he did not see this avoidance tactic
as illegitimate: "[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times
when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger
ends." Id. at 65.
The fourth, dominating method, the method of sociology, considers "the welfare of society. The
rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence." Id. at 66. When judges "are called
upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of society
fix the path, its direction and its distance." Id. at 67. Cardozo, likely believing it unnecessary, also
did not invoke this method in MacPherson.
88. For cases in which Cardozo's judgments seem faulty, see Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 138
N.E. 33 (N.Y. 1923) (municipality not liable for low water pressure when fire spreads); H.R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928) (bank not liable for erroneous release of funds
to defraud). For strong criticism of the Moch opinion, see Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon
GratuitousPromisesor Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 920-21 (1951) (indicating "perhaps his
most unsatisfactory opinion in the field of torts"); and for dissatisfaction with Whiting, see
LLEWELLYN, supra note 76,at 441-45 (referring to the second branch of this opinion as a "blooper").
One of our colleagues even attacks one of Cardozo's most famous opinions, Palsgrafv. Long Island
R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), for Cardozo's failure to distinguish duty from proximate cause and to
identify the nature of the negligence in question. That we are treading on sacred ground was evidenced
by the fact that another colleague, who shall remain nameless, refused to identify any faulty Cardozo
opinions for fear it would come back to haunt him in future confirmation hearings.
89. See generally KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, ch. 2 (Law and Economics).
90. Of course, as suggested above, see supra text accompanying notes 35-75, once the first
granite block is taken from the citadel of privity, the castle wall begins to come down rapidly. For
example, even cotton balls can be dangerous if left in a baby's crib (although the obviousness of the
danger may be a defense) and the parties injured may well not be those who purchased the product.
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* Defining efficiency by the standard law and economics yardstick of utilitarian wealth
maximization," is "the size of the pie" increased by restricting lawsuits according
to the privity defense rather than by using the foreseeability test articulated in
MacPherson?
* By imposing liability on Buick in the absence of a contract directly with
MacPherson, was the court disrupting the decentralized market choices manifested
in the private bargains struck between Buick and its retail dealer, and between the
dealer and MacPherson? If so, is this to be lamented?
" Was the court, as an organ of the government, essentially making a "top down"
economic decision, as occurs in a command or centralized economy, regarding the
ultimate allocation of resources, thereby overriding the "bottom up" "invisible hand"
decisionmaking of classical capitalism between private parties?
* Will producer liability drive away other entrepreneurs and capital from producing
automobiles, thereby, keeping car prices artificially high by discouraging
competition? Will the market be depressed to the point where economies of scale
are lost? To the point where the savings from spreading fixed production costs over
a larger output is substantially lost?
" On the other hand, should this economic decision imposing producer liability be
made more overtly by a "top down" organ of the government, such as by a
regulatory agency? Is this likely to be a better considered decision than that of a
court? Or are the administrative costs of an agency decision likely to be greater than
that of a common law decision?
" Assuming the imposition of liability on Buick will induce it to produce safer cars,
will this significantly reduce the number of accidents and the damage to roads and
highways that come from them? Or will drivers simply drive less carefully when
they believe cars are safer? Will the savings in maintenance expenditures stimulate
various governments to build more roads? If so, is this an overall social benefit?
The Conditionsfor the Invisible Hand. When MacPherson entered the contract
of sale with the Buick automobile dealer, how ideally satisfied were the criteria for

the workings of the invisible hand? Did the parties have complete information about
the transaction?
" With respect to the issue at hand, did MacPherson correctly anticipate the safety
risks involved? Could MacPherson realistically translate into monetary terms this
"hidden" cost of purchasing the car? If not, did this mislead MacPherson in his
decision whether to opt for other makes of automobiles or alternatives to car
ownership?
* What is the effect of the substantial costs in resolving the dispute between Buick and
MacPherson on the allocation of resources relating to automobile manufacturing?
What is the effect from the government providing highly subsidized courtrooms,
sense to view privity as completely abrogated than to attempt to slice too finely the items that fall
within the defense. Consequently, it is no surprise that post-MacPhersonproducts liability law moved
in that direction.
91. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (4th ed. 1992).
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judges and other court personnel, etc.? Should the litigating parties, or the party
who loses, be required to absorb these costs?
" When contracting, were MacPherson and the Buick dealer in positions to make fully
rational choices? Did MacPherson enter the transaction with pre-established
preferences that were consciously satisfied, or at least "satisficed," ' by the particular
purchase?
* Did Buick's advertising simply provide information to MacPherson, or was it likely
that it went beyond that and also unduly affected his preferences by distorting his

values through irrelevant subconscious associations triggered by presentations from
attractive spokespersons in idealized settings?93
" Insofar as MacPherson was not fully "rational," should the common law take this
into account? Might this have been one of the unspoken reasons for Cardozo's
decision to find Buick liable under the circumstances?
" Were there substantial transaction costs? What were they? Did the Buick dealer or
MacPherson have higher relative transaction costs? Should this be relevant? Was
the automobile market highly competitive? Why? Did the transaction between
MacPherson and the dealer create externalities? Positive or negative? What were
they?
" How would these externalities affect the automobile market? Can they be
internalized? How? Does the automobile market consist of undifferentiated
products?'
* In sum, to the extent that the ideal conditions for the invisible hand were unmet, what
was the effect of this shortfall on MacPherson's choice? The general automobile
market? Does this warrant governmental imposition of liability for negligence on
Buick to parties not in privity?
" Should it be relevant to Buick's liability that some of the shortfalls from the ideal
market stemmed from the activities of the presumably independent Buick dealer?

The Goals of the Market Economy. Owing to the imperfections in the market for
automobiles, or imperfections encountered by MacPherson and the Buick dealer in
the particular transaction, is it likely that the trade in issue was not Pareto superior?"5
Was it likely to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient?96
92. The term "satisfice" was coined by Herbert Simon who states that "[in a satisficing model,
search terminates when the best offer exceeds an aspiration level that itself adjusts gradually to the
value of the offers received so far." Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of
Thought, in MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 444, 453 (1982).
93. For more on the distortions in the consumer marketplace, see Bailey Kuklin, The
Asymmetrical Conditions ofLegal Responsibility in the Marketplace,44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990).
94. "Products are undifferentiated when buyers cannot distinguish among the various sellers'
competitive products (they all seem the same), and sellers cannot distinguish the willingness of each
buyer to buy, that is, how much above the asking price they would be willing to pay." KUKLIN &
STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 33.
95. "A Pareto superior change is one that makes at least one person better off without making
anyone worse off." Id. at 33-34. This is distinguished from Pareto optimality, an ideal condition at
which trades naturally cease, which "occurs when resources are allocated in such a way that no one is
willing to trade further." Id. at 33.
96. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is satisfied "[w]hen the overall gains [from a trade] outweigh the
losses." Id. at 34.
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" In answering these questions, must the court resort to a hypothetical market? How
accurate is this device?
* Are there "moralisms" involved to further skew the court's valuations?" What are
they?
The Justificationof the Market Economy. Might the market imperfections in the
transaction between MacPherson and the Buick dealer have been so substantial as to
decrease overall utility? Is this evaluation to be made on the basis of costs and
benefits at the time of the transaction, or after the unfortunate circumstances leading
to MacPherson's injury?
* Even if there was a loss in utility in this case, would this be generally true of
automobile purchases? If utility is generally increased by such purchases, does this
destroy MacPherson's moral claim to a recovery despite his losing trade?
" Do the market imperfections run afoul of the Kantian theory ofjustice? Were the
parties, MacPherson in particular, in a realistic sense "rational" persons, each
recognizing the other as an end in himself by respecting the other's autonomous
choice?
" Or do the imperfections in the marketplace (e.g., inadequate information about the
costs and risks associated with the ownership of the Buick), undermine the Kantian
support for the contract?
* Does the market, in general, satisfy Kantian maxims of justice?
" If it does in general, but not in the case of MacPherson, what should the court do
about it? Does the court's rule of finding liability for negligently caused personal
injuries despite the lack of privity respond to the Kantian demands? Are there better
responses?
The Coase Theorem. Is it a cost of purchasing an automobile that occasionally a
buyer will be personally injured by a defect resulting from the negligence of the
manufacturer, or is it a cost of producing automobiles that occasionally a defect
resulting from the negligence of the manufacturer will personally injure a buyer?
Why?
" If, despite the consequential inefficiency, the court allowed Buick to maintain the
freedom from liability for negligently caused personal injuries to third parties, would
future automobile purchasers be in a position to contract around the entitlement by
getting Buick to agree to assume such liability?
* Is such an entitlement normally protected by a property, a liability, or an
inalienability rule?
" What complications to bargaining around inefficiencies follow from the fact that the
purchasers and Buick are not in direct contractual relationships?

97. Moralisms "are public goods that are beyond objective valuation (e.g., some of the aesthetic
at 34.
and moral values supporting environmentalism)." Id.
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" Could purchasers as a class be organized to approach Buick en masse regarding the
entitlement? Will organizational or transaction costs preclude this tactic? What
about free-rider problems?
" Could purchasers as a group effectively obtain the entitlement from Buick by.
bargaining with the presumably independent Buick dealer? Could individual
purchasers obtain the entitlement through the dealer? Even if feasible, is the dealer
likely to be willing to bargain with individuals over such a term? Why?
" If there are substantial problems with free bargaining over Buick's entitlement, can
the court facilitate the trade by rulings short of the one made in MacPherson(i.e.,
short of simply assigning it outright to the purchaser)?
* Under the rule of MacPherson, does Buick confront similar organizational or
transactional costs, or the free-rider problems that purchasers would face if the court
continued to allocate the entitlement to Buick? Might there be holdout problems?
* Would a simple contractual disclaimer of liability suffice to transfer the entitlement
to Buick? If so, should a court refuse to enforce the boilerplate disclaimer? Why?
If the court does not enforce the term, the purchaser's entitlement would be said to
be protected by what kind of rule?
" What are the distributive consequences of allocating the entitlement to Buick or to
purchasers?
Additional Concepts andPrinciples. Should the justification of the MacPherson
rule account for other economic considerations, such as those stemming from loss
spreading, risk attitudes, moral hazard, the declining marginal utility of wealth, the
"deep pocket" concept, interpersonal utility comparisons, risk avoidance, and
transaction costs? Do each of these considerations weigh for or against Cardozo's
rule? How much weight do they hold under the circumstances? How can one tell?
" Does the rule of MacPhersonserve the goal of loss spreadingbetter than the prior
rule? In this current age of ubiquitous automobile insurance, does loss spreading
remain a legitimate consideration in these cases? Does this depend on the standard
insurance coverage? In your experience, what is it?
" Do the typical risk attitudes of an automobile manufacturer and its purchasers affect
the analysis of which liability rule is better? What is the risk attitude of a corporate
actor? How might the risk attitude of a buyer affect the liability exposure of Buick
under the rule of MacPherson?
* If buyers as a class are risk averse, would this argue for or against the rule? What
if they are risk preferrers? Since an individual's attitude toward risk depends
partially on the circumstances, what is the likely effect under the circumstances in
MacPherson?
* Does moral hazard hang over the rule of MacPherson? Does it hang over the
original rule insulating parties from liability for negligently caused personal injuries
to third parties? If it hangs over both rules, where does it hold more weight under
the circumstances in issue?
" Under the rule of MacPherson,is an automobile buyer likely to become less careful
because she is "insured" by Buick for certain types of losses? Will her level of
personal care fall all the way down to just above the threshold of contributory
negligence because of the "insurance" by Buick? Why?
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" If Buick was not liable for any losses to third parties, would its level of care fall?
How far? What, if anything, would keep Buick from allowing its level of care from
falling through the basement?
" If moral hazard hangs over both rules (i.e., either that manufacturers are completely

liable to third parties for product injuries or that they are not liable at all), are there

"

"

"

"

*

*

"

*

*

other rules that could eliminate or reduce it? What might they be? Do common law
courts ever adopt these types of solutions? Do legislatures? Do private contracting
parties?
Assuming Buick is a wealthier party than MacPherson, does the declining marginal
utility of wealth support Buick's liability? Since Buick is a corporate actor, in what
manner is the supposed human response to differing wealth to be built into the
calculus of Buick's relative marginal utility? Is one to compare the wealth of
prospective injured parties to the wealth of corporate officers whose incomes depend
on profits, individual shareholders, and others who benefit from the corporation's
prosperity? How?
In advancing this "deeppocket" argument, can interpersonalutility comparisonsbe
made realistically? Is one person's preference for wealth incommensurable to
another person's? In any event, should the comparisons be made case by case or
rule by rule?
Should the numerous exceptions to the commonly accepted observations supporting
the declining marginal utility of wealth (e.g., the grasping Scrooge) be sufficient to
remove this factor from consideration by a court? By a legislature? Are the
utilitarian justifications for the "deep pocket" concept offset by Kantian and other
justice counterarguments? What are they? Are there rebuttals to them?
Does the principle of risk avoidance support the rule in MacPherson? Is the
automobile manufacturer in a better position to avoid the risk of defective wheels
and other components than the purchaser? Is the automobile dealer in a better
position to avoid the risk than the purchaser? Than the automobile manufacturer?
If the dealer is in a better position to avoid the risk than the buyer, does this argue
that among the four parties involved in MacPherson (i.e., the component (wheel)
supplier, the automobile manufacturer, the dealer, and the buyer), it should be the
dealer who is liable to the buyer since it was the only one in privity of contract with
MacPherson?
Speaking of the wheelmaker, was it the party in the best position to avoid the loss?
If so, should it be the only party liable to the buyer, the lack of privity
notwithstanding?
If it is uncertain which of the four parties is in the best position to avoid the risk,
which party can best do a cost-benefit analysis of whether the risk should be avoided
and, if necessary, "bribe" the best risk avoider?
By what means can this risk best be avoided? How far can the risk be reduced?
Entirely? Even if entirely, is the best risk avoider likely to reduce it that far? As a
practical matter, how far will it be reduced?
If the most efficient response to the risks of injury is through the cooperative
behavior of more than one of the parties (e.g., by somewhat more care by the
supplier, closer inspection by the manufacturer, and more diligent maintenance by
the buyer), will the rule in MacPherson encourage this cooperation? Would any
other plausible rule do it better?
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" Is the buyer in a position to bargain with the dealer, and thereby indirectly with the
manufacturer and the supplier, over assuming the liability? Why?
" Are there information, opportunity, and other transaction costs occurring here that
do not occur to the same extent when the three commercial enterprises are
bargaining over the risk? Does the difference stem partially from the fact that a
buyer is essentially involved in a "one-shot" transaction with the dealer, whereas the
commercial parties are repeat players, with respect to one another, engaged in ongoing contracts?
" Do the amounts of money involved in the various transactions affect whether the
parties will shift the liabilities of the common law rules? Would these problems be
overcome if buyers organized as a group to bargain with dealers over the liability for
these risks? Is this likely to happen? Why? If not, in deciding what rule to adopt,
should the court take this into account? How?

Speaking of transactioncosts, what forms of them exist in the interactions among
the four parties in MacPherson? What information costs does MacPherson confront?
What information is relevant, or at least important, in deciding whether to buy a
particular Buick from this particular dealer, rather than another car or dealer, or even

opting for another form of transportation? From where might this information be
obtained? How is the information to be evaluated or equated to a monetary amount?
What kind of information is involved?
" With respect to a defective wheel, is this an inspection or a search quality?" Why?
* Is it a use quality?" Is it a credence quality?'" Is it a combination of the three?
" What opportunity costs are there? Could these ever be "negative" costs, as for the
consumer who gets pleasure from the process of buying a new car?
* If MacPherson noticed something unusual about one of the wheels, how would he
evaluate the dealer's offer "to knock $10 off the price" if he bought the Buick "as
is"? What transaction costs exist in the interactions among the three commercial
enterprises? What are their relative magnitudes as against one another and as against
the buyer? Should this be a consideration in determining the respective liability
rules?
What are the administrative costs in MacPherson? Are they fully internalized in

the dispute resolution process? If not, should they be? What would be the
consequences of making the parties fully internalize these costs? What if only the
losing party paid for them all?

98. "Inspection or search qualities are those that can be immediately judged, such as the
sharpness of the television picture or the excellence of the perfume fragrance." Id. at 42 (emphasis
omitted).
99. "Use qualities are those that require time to evaluate, such as the durability or energy
consumption of particular goods." Id. (emphasis omitted).
100. "Credence qualities are those that are difficult to evaluate even after the passage of time, such
as whether all the services of the doctor or lawyer were truly required or whether the car transmission
actually needed replacement." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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* Were the overall administrative costs about the same under the prior rule
recognizing the privity defense? Or were they higher since, for all the relative
liabilities to be pursued, MacPherson must sue the dealer, who must sue Buick, who
must sue the supplier?"'
" Does the multiplication of lawsuits create opportunities for strategic behavior as the
participants engage in a war of attrition? What might this behavior be? What will
be the result? What, if anything, is wrong with it?
" If the dealer is insolvent, does this effectively end MacPherson's chances of
recovery?
" What if the party most at fault, say, the wheelmaker, is beyond the reach of the
court's jurisdiction?'" Is this something that MacPherson must worry about? Might
mandatory joinder of all entities involved in the Buick incident eliminate some of
these additional administrative costs from the piecemeal litigation?" Instead,
although the successfully sued dealer may be permitted to seek indemnity from
Buick, as a practical matter would it be deterred from doing so for fear of fraying
relations with the manufacturer whose products it needs to sell to make a living? If
so, is this response to be regretted?
" What if Buick had insisted on a "hold harmless" provision as a condition of doing
business with the dealer? Should such a provision be enforced by the courts? In
general, then, whether it is the privity defense, a "hold harmless" provision, or any
other reason for not pursuing liability back to the manufacturer or supplier, does this
effectively allow these parties to externalize on consumers the costs of injuries
caused by defective products? So what?
" Would administrative costs be further reduced under a regime of strict products
liability? How? If so, are there other trade-offs? What are they?
" Is it really the recognition of strict liability that has triggered the clamorous modern
debate over products liability?'0 4
101. Under the privity rule, atypical consumer injured by a defective product is not, technically,
deprived of a legal remedy. She can sue the retailer. If all goes well, the dealer pays a resulting
judgment and then sues the manufacturer and obtains indemnity. But all may not go well for the
plaintiff. The retailer may go out of business. If the defect was caused by a component part, the
manufacturer in turn sues the supplier, who may then sue another supplier, who sues a designer, who
sues a testing lab, and so on.
102. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) ("[Tlhe mere
awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered
outside the United States would reach the forum State in the stream of commerce [does not]
constitute- 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of
jurisdiction 'does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
103. In modem federal court practice, the three commercial parties might be joined by the plaintiff,
brought in by third party claims, or be the subject of cross-claims. But in 1916, this was not a realistic
option under New York civil practice.
104. There are, of course, many additional questions raised by the prospect of strict
liability-fairness, for one. Furthermore, some commentators argue that a regime of strict products
liability induces no more care by the manufacturer than one of negligence, but merely adds to the
manufacturer's cost of doing business without any attendant social benefit. See, e.g., JULEs L.
COLEMAN, RisKs AND WRONGS 412-15 (1992); R. McKean, Products Liability: Implicationsof Some
ChangingPropertyRights, in THE ECONOMICS Or PROPERTY RIGHTS 49, 58-59 (Eirik G. Furubotn &
Svetozar Pejovich eds., 1974); Walter Y. Oi, The Economics ofProduct Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Scl. 3 (1973). For the suggestion that strict liability might lead to less quality control than
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Does the automobile market, or the market for Buick automobiles, involve
economic rents?' 5 Why? If so, what are the consequences? Should the court then
be more willing to impose liability for injuries on the manufacturer?
* Was Buick likely to have engaged in rent-seeking? 1" How might this be done?
* Will the rule in MacPhersonfacilitate rent-seeking?
Along with the considerations of risk avoidance and transaction costs, are there
other important factors in deciding whether the rule in MacPhersonadvances the
goal of cost minimization or socialefficiency? In other words, will the rule result in
consumers getting more of what they want for less?
* Once the citadel of privity is seen as threatened, will manufacturers raise the price
of their products to fund the increasing costs of products liability litigation and
victim compensation?
* Will whole new lines of insurance and carriers emerge with their own accompanying
administrative costs and needs for profits, thus resulting in higher final costs to the
consumer? Or will these additional costs in the form of higher price tags for
consumer products be offset by the reduced costs of private consumer insurance,
savings from safer products, lowered consumer information costs, diminished moral
hazard by producers, etc.? How is a court or legislature to determine this?
* What types of interests are affected by the rule in MacPherson? Liberty interests?
Equality interests? Want satisfactions?
* How important is it that some consumers will be compensated who would otherwise
be left destitute? Should this aim be sought through the regulation of the private
market rather than through direct government compensation? In other words, should
this coverage be paid for by manufacturers in the form of lower profits, and by other
consumers in the form "safety taxes" through higher product price tags?" 7
* What are the externalities in the consumer market? Can they be internalized? How
elastic is the market in automobiles? In producing automobiles, what are the returns
to scale?
* How regulated is this particular market? Is this market dominated by a monopoly
or an oligopoly? If so, what are the likely consequences? Insofar as the market is
dominated, will the rule in MacPhersonhave beneficial effects? Are there barriers
to entry into this market? What are they? What are the answers to these questions
with respect to the other markets reached by the rule in MacPherson?
negligence liability, see JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERsKI, PRODUCTS LIA.BILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 17-19 (2d ed. 1992).

105. Economic rents accrue when "the market price of a product is not governed by its production
cost." KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 43.
106. Rent-seeking occurs when a "scarcity... [is] artificially created, as where a producer seeks
to reduce competition by restrictive, government regulation." Id
107. John Rawls's veil of ignorance can be invoked. If we knew the risk of injury from defective
products, but not whether we would be among the injured, would we opt to pay more for the product
to allow suit for recovery if we were among the injured? See RAWLS, supra note 22, at 136-42
(discussing "The Veil of Ignorance").
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0 In response to these questions, is it feasible for the court to adopt one rule for the
market in automobiles and another rule for additional markets in similarly dangerous
products (e.g., for pleasure boats or farm equipment), in which the various factors
cut against the rule in MacPherson?
Is the private litigation system really the best mechanism for compensating
sufferers of product-related injuries under theories of either tort, contract, or
warranty?
* Would a system of mandatory, first-party insurance, or of a mandatory
manufacturers' insurance fund, put more compensation dollars in the pockets of
sufferers? But would such a regime fail to effectively deter careless, if not negligent,
behavior by producers? Might this be overcome by providing for criminal or other
public prosecution of manufacturers who are unreasonably careless in making
products?
" Yet, as a practical matter, are public agencies too often swamped with enforcement
demands and, therefore, unable to pursue a high percentage of legitimate
opportunities for regulation? Might the manufacturers "capture" the public
regulators and thereby avoid mandated supervision?' ° Are public entities too
vulnerable to political or social pressures, resulting in suppressed prosecutions
against powerful manufacturers?
* Under a regime of private tort and contract litigation, where any disgruntled injured
party may invoke the judiciary-a body of decisionmakers with considerable job
security in the federal system-are the undue pressures on the public regulatory
scheme avoided? In other words, without private enforcement, would a sufficient
number of manufacturers be held accountable?
" Or will private enforcement lead to overreaching by litigants seeking unjustified, but
economic, settlements of frivolous lawsuits? On the other hand, will injured
consumers be able to afford adequate representation or resist if a manufacturer
engages in a litigation war of attrition?
Are the answers to all the questions in this section of little or no use to rational
& 9
Do the many
judicial decisionmaking because of the theory of second best?
economic factors interrelate in such complicated ways that, to be predictive,
consideration of one of them must simultaneously account for the virtually infinite
number of ripple effects on all the others?
* Or, to load the question, since some decision is unavoidable, is this proposed
capitulation to the complexity of reality, particularly human interactive reality,
simply a timid surrender to human passions undisciplined by impartial analysis?

108. For the "capture theory" of public regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation,2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).

109. "Under the theory of second best, ... [t]he 'second-best' state of affairs will not track closely
the first best in all ways but one. Instead, it will usually depart in several respects." KUKLIN &
STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 44.
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The Usefulness of Economic Analysis of Law. How useful is this economic
analysis of MacPherson? Since the conditions for the ideal market of the invisible
hand are never fully met, is this merely a dry academic exercise without value to the
real world? Is economic analysis at least better than nothing, or does this way of
putting it unduly disparage its true predictive power?
" Are any other analytical tools more useful?
" What is the role of matters ofjustice, including corrective and distributive justice?
* Does the recognition of the privity defense effectively shift wealth from the injured
consumers to manufacturers? How are these considerations to be weighed against
the economic ones? Are there others to be weighed? How are these to be compared
to, and balanced against, the imperfect tool of economic analysis?
3.

PoliticalPhilosophy and ProductsLiabilityLaw' 10

Libertarian.What would be the basic stance of a libertarian toward the rule in
MacPherson,one of approval or disapproval? Why?
* What libertarian interests are thwarted or invaded by the rule? In what manner does
this occur?
" Are any libertarian interests protected by the rule? If a libertarian disapproves of the
rule, would she accept a modification of it short of complete overruling? What
might this be?
" Are the likely libertarian objections grounded in utilitarian reasoning? Kantian
reasoning?
Does a libertarian object to the rule in MacPhersonbecause it was adopted by a
common law court? Is the common law adoption of the rule a reflection of its
perceived origin in the natural law, in other words, a recognition by the court that the
underlying principle of liability follows from natural reason, independent of positive
rules? Does a libertarian object in theory to natural law principles? If not, would the
particular principle of liability adopted in MacPherson be one that is acceptable?
Would it be acceptable if the rule was enacted by legislation? Why?
* When might a libertarian not oppose the rule? Would it suffice if all the members
of society consent to the rule? Must they actually consent? What if their elected
representatives consent on their behalf? For that matter, do all libertarians welcome
the notion of elected representatives? If not, what is the range of libertarian thought
110. See id. ch. 3 (Political Philosophy and Law). We believe it is useful for law students to

become familiar with the broad outlines of Western political thought For this reason our book surveys

its history, primarily by examining the philosophy of leading thinkers. See id. at 48-63. But generally,
the application of the theory is best done, we believe, by focusing on particular issues from the vantage
points taken by typical members at various locations on the political spectrum (i.e., libertarian,
conservative, liberal and communitarian). While it can be an interesting exercise to ponder what

Aquinas or Rousseau would say about products liability law, few law school courses have the luxury
to engage in it.
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on this issue? Would some libertarians approve of the rule if it is simply
demonstrated that all rational or reasonable persons would consent?
" Because MacPherson entered the contract of purchase with the Buick dealer
apparently without any warranty coverage for the defect in issue, would a libertarian
insist that he be denied a remedy since, in this regard, he failed to take care of
himself? Is it apt to say that he was "responsible" for this failure? If MacPherson
sought warranty coverage from Buick or the dealer, would he be likely to obtain it
at this time in history? If not, was he "responsible" for this failure?
" If warranty coverage was unobtainable, what else could MacPherson have done to
protect himself? Are alternative solutions likely to be as efficient as a warranty? If
not, does this affect the question of his responsibility for failing to protect himself?.
Would a libertarian assert that because MacPherson failed to protect himself, he
"deserved" to lose any claims against the wheelmaker, Buick, and the dealer? By
what standards of "desert" would this assertion be defensible? By what standards
would this assertion be rejected?
Conservative. Would a Lockean conservative, who closely circumscribes the
reach of the government for the sake of protecting individual liberty, approve of the
rule in MacPherson? Why? Does the rule invade anyone's liberty? If so, in what
manner?
* Is the court's exercise of power in granting relief to MacPherson likely to further
such exercises? Is this the road to a corrupt judiciary? In what way might the court
become corrupt? Will the court, upon exercising greater power, be tempted to abuse
it? How might this abuse be manifested?
* Do these answers depend on the quality of the judiciary? Would a Lockean be
satisfied with expanded judicial powers after adopting methods of assuring a highly
competent judiciary? What methods could be adopted?
* Would the Lockean advance similar objections if the rule in MacPherson is adopted
by the legislative branch? Why? How would the objections differ?
Would a Smithean conservative, who, in accordance with the views of Adam
Smith, commonly prefers efficiency to liberty (usually best accomplished by allowing
individual parties the unfettered freedom of contract), approve of the rule in
MacPherson? Why?
* Is this one of the instances in which the market does not operate efficiently and,
therefore, government intervention must be considered? What argues against its
efficient operation? What argues for it?
* Insofar as there is inefficiency, is government intervention likely to overcome it?
What might the government do? Can the courts or the legislature do it better?
* Does the rule in MacPherson improve efficiency? In light of the litigation, was it
efficient for MacPherson and Buick in this case? Is this controlling for the
Smithean?
• Are there other rules that would better increase efficiency? What are they? In order
to meet the needs of efficient dispute resolution, should the rule in MacPhersonnow
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be treated as settled? Is it clearly delineated? Easily applied? What are possible
improvements?
Should the rule be subject to modification through private agreement by the parties?
Why?
Because these questions are difficult to answer, does the rule simply reflect the
middle class values of the court, rather than the values or preferences of the parties?
Was Buick's liberty unduly impinged? MacPherson's? Is overall societal
satisfaction advanced or hindered?
If overall satisfaction is increased by the rule, but Buick's or MacPherson's liberty
is also impinged by it, would a Smithean still prefer it? To answer this, must
satisfaction and liberty be quantified and then weighed against one another? While
satisfaction might be quantified in theory in terms of overall wealth, as Posner would
have it,"' can the notion of liberty be coherently quantified? If so, how? If it cannot
be quantified, what would a Smithean do when trade-offs are confronted? Refuse
the trade-off in principle by always favoring either efficiency or liberty? Which
one?
Does the rule in MacPherson involve a trade-off? Is it a compromise? Are there
better compromises? What are they? Why are they better?
Would a Smithean adopt the rule for the sake of possible redistributive consequences
(i.e., because it appears to shift wealth from the class of producers and merchants to
the class of poorer consumers)? Why? If not, does the Smithean reject altogether
the governmental function of redistribution? When, if ever, is it appropriate?

Would a Burkean conservative, who is a traditionalist like Edmund Burke, valuing
the conservation of the inherited wisdom of society and wary of the unpredictable
repercussions of change, approve of the rule in MacPherson?
" Is it acceptable as simply a natural, evolutionary accretion to the pre-existing law?
Or would Cardozo's expansion of existing precedent be considered a departure from
tradition, if not in the rule itself, then in the further move from contract to tort
(status), from privity to foreseeability, from exception to rule, possibly even in
further greasing the skids for a move from negligence to strict liability?
" In general, is the doctrine of stare decisis based on Burkean reasoning? Or would
a Burkean sanctify precedent beyond the standard of stare decisis (i.e., that
precedent is generally binding)?
* Would a Burkean prefer the common law to a powerful legislature since the common
law evolves in incremental steps, not the potentially dramatic, less predictable ones
within legislative prerogatives? Or does the rule in MacPherson consummate a
change in the law too rapid to avoid the disruption of social traditions and values?
* When are social traditions and values disrupted? Looking back over the state of
society since MacPherson,has the rule ultimately met Burkean aims? If not, how
has it failed? If so, would a Burkean now object to a return to pre-MacPherson
rules?
" Does the rule represent a significant transformation of society, from one that, under
caveat emptor, values the rugged individualism of those who take care of
111. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 26, ch. 12.
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themselves, to one that, under caveat venditor, values the security obtained from the
assured confidence in the products one purchases? Is this a fair characterization of
the transformation, if any? How else might it be characterized?
* Insofar as the characterization is fair, would a Burkean object to the nature of the
transformation, the fact that there was a transformation, or the rapidity of the
transformation? If the latter, in whole or inpart, how might a slower transformation
take place? Are the courts the proper engine of such cautious change? The
legislature? Both? Neither?
* If a conservative values the promotion of community over individualism, but is
distrustful of designed transformation, is it possible for this person to approve of
movement from an individualistic to a communitarian society? Does the rule in
MacPhersonreflect such a movement? What type of movement, if any, would be
acceptable?
Do these three strains of conservatism come out on the same side of the rule in
MacPherson? To summarize, which approve and which disapprove? If they diverge,
if not here, then in the assessment of other legal rules, is it possible for a single
political party to hold itself out as "the" conservative party? How?
Liberal. Would a welfare state liberal applaud the rule in MacPherson?
* As a Rawlsian liberal behind the veil of ignorance, would a rational person opt for
the rule? Why? Does the rule reflect the sort of legal regime that would emerge
from a Rawlsian town meeting in that it considers the safety interests of individuals
and promotes a rule that will enhance this while properly limiting the wealth
differential between manufacturers and consumers, at least those consumers who are
unlucky enough to be injured by a defective automobile? Does it align with the
liberal's view of desert?
* Or would the liberal assert that MacPherson deserved to remain without a remedy
because, for one possible reason, he failed to better protect himself?. To generalize,
under what standards of desert would it be concluded that MacPherson did not
deserve relief and under what standards that he did deserve relief? Which of these
standards are liberty-oriented and which are equality-oriented? The liberal
subscribes to which ones?
* If the liberal standards of desert cut both ways in this case, which predominate? Or
do questions of MacPherson's desert play no role in the issue of the case? Do
questions of Buick's desert play a role? If so, what standards of desert argue for and
against Buick's liability? What about the deserts of the Buick dealer and the
wheelmaker?
" Would a liberal favor the rule in MacPhersonbecause of its perceived redistributive
effects from producers and merchants to consumers? Would a liberal embrace the
\ rule for this reason alone? On what justification? Or would a liberal prefer that the
legislature enact, rather than the court adopt, redistributive measures? Why?
* If the purchase contract in MacPhersonincluded a broad liability disclaimer clause,
are the shortfalls from the ideal market reason enough for the liberal to intervene and
override the clause? Is the liberal more or less willing to do this than the Smithean
conservative? To what extent would the liberal take into account the economic
consequences of the rule?
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* Might a liberal accept the rule of liability on the ground that she believes it is good
for MacPherson to have its protections? Why? Would it make a difference that
MacPherson also believed it was good for himself? What would be the conclusion
if some consumers disagreed?
Communitarian. What is the position of a communitarian regarding the rule in
MacPherson? In this context, is it possible to ascribe a single position to
communitarians? If not, what is the range of potential positions? Why might they
differ?
0 Does a communitarian have the same concern as the liberal over whether the rule is
actually good for consumers or is perceived by them to be so? Why?
e Do communitarian standards ofjustice play a role in the issue in MacPherson? If
so, what are they? How are they justified or derived? Is justice based on theories
of desert in the eyes of a communitarian? Why?
* Under the communitarian visions, should MacPherson, Buick, the dealer, or the
wheelmaker be ultimately responsible for the loss? Why? What are the relative
responsibilities (i.e., what if the party ultimately responsible is judgment proof)?
What community or communities are involved in the rule of liability?
* If more than one community is affected, how is their relative priority to be
determined if one community's interests must bow to another's? Is it the identity of
the particular community that counts, or the community's interests at stake, or both?
How are these to be balanced? Should the courts or the legislature do the balancing?
In sum, which political orientations and variations would favor the rule in
MacPherson? Which ones would oppose the rule? Which ones provide no clear
guidance?
4.

American GovernmentalStructure: Its Impact on Products LiabilityLaw"2

ConstitutionalStructure. While ordinarily one does not think of an automobile
accident or product liability litigation as raising issues of constitutional law, is this
impression a form of misplaced snobbery or undue reverence to matters of the
constitution? Do cases come to mind in which rather ordinary litigation has created
significant constitutional precedent? 1 '3 Does not MacPhersonexemplify the reality
that constitutional issues and the impact of political structure pervade virtually every
legal question? Can it be said that many of the prior questions turn on issues
regarding society's allocation of decisionmaking authority?

112. See generallyKuKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, ch. 4 (American Government Structure: Its
Impact on Law).
113. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (announcing major
retrenchment in expanding notions of personal jurisdiction and Due Process Clause that had dominated
court decisions during the post-war era in a case arising from an automobile accident); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (ruling that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to counsel
provided by state where conviction poses risk of incarceration). For an interesting retelling of this last
case, see ANTHoNY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
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Federalism. Although the political theorists previously discussed had strong views
regarding the embrace or avoidance of change, the role of the market, and the ideal
degree of governmental authority over the individual, were they not remarkably silent
on questions of whether proper government authority should be centered at a local,
state, or national level? Did this perhaps result from their European backgrounds,
where a significant degree of national authority seems to be assumed (everywhere but
Switzerland, we suppose)?
* Is the developed concept of federalism a substantial contribution to world political
theory made by the American framers and their ideological descendants? Are states'
rights an American notion at root? Chauvinism aside, is it a concept about which to
brag?
* In the context of MacPherson,how did the American version of "Our Federalism"
expand or limit Cardozo's options in deciding the case?" 4 Would Cardozo have
been equally as likely to grasp the baton for change if he had been subject to a
nationwide body of products liability law decided from the U.S. Supreme Court on
down?
" If one posits that national and unified doctrinal standards are harder to sway, is this
good or bad? What about the notion that states should be permitted to be
"laboratories" of a sort that experiment with different legal rules and subsystems?"'
* Does the Brandeisian notion of state-by-state experimentation make any sense when
the product under review is intimately tied to interstate commerce, marketed and
used nationally? Why should Buick be subject to a different legal regime in New
York than in other jurisdictions? Does this pose only problems in principle for
manufacturers, or are there concrete examples of unacceptably high costs associated
with a state-by-state regime of products liability?
* Can manufacturers satisfactorily avoid the costs of differing state requirements by
simply complying with the most stringent state rule everywhere? Does it make a
difference whether the various state requirements are based on rules or standards?
What is the distinction between these two concepts?
" Why have efforts (backed vigorously by the national business community) to
legislate national products liability law failed thus far? Can this be attributed only
to the power of the plaintiff's trial bar, which generally opposes such efforts not so
much on Brandeisian grounds as because the national standards favored by the
business lobby are generally less favorable to plaintiffs than those applying in
virtually every state?
* Is it surprising that important public policy issues in America tend to turn on
considerations of whose ox is getting gored rather than on a serious and reflective
debate regarding the optimal means of regulating manufactured products?
* But, political cynicism aside, does the divergence of existing judicial precedent
(which largely adheres to MacPherson-likeanalyses of product defect and liability
114. The famous phrase "Our Federalism" is from Justice Black in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 38 (1971).
115. The recommendation of the virtues of state "laboratories" is associated with Justice
Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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issues) and the most prominent examples of legislative "reform" say something
significant about the relevant competence of legislators and judges (which is also a
separation of powers issue) and about the relative competence of state and federal
authorities (which is a federalism issue)?".6
Separationof Powers."7 While separation of powers issues are normally most
prominent when a court is asked to rule on matters affecting a statute (the product of
the legislature) or the executive's enforcement or disregard of a statutory or
constitutional provision, can the seemingly private and common law-driven case of
MacPhersonbe assessed according to separation of powers analysis?
* Though much of the current rhetoric of law and democracy enshrines the legislature
and raises fears about "government by judiciary," do recent events surrounding
debates about products liability tend to belie the conventional wisdom? Is it relevant
to the debate that courts have generally followed the tradition of MacPherson,which
most lawyers (and certainly most legal academicians) regard as a well-reasoned
opinion and a sensible regime of liability for manufacturers?
" What is to be made of the fact that, on the one hand, courts have applied legal
doctrines such as the collateral source rule (banning mention of insurance during
products liability trials) and joint-and-several liability (placing the "deep pocket"
manufacturer who is five percent at fault potentially on the hook for a victim's entire
damages judgment), while, on the other hand, legislative initiatives on the subject
have a decidedly more pro-manufacturer slant? Does this mean that legislatures are
simply too eager to please the business community (which funds political campaigns
and keeps mobilized a vast army of lobbyists)? Or does it mean that judges are
hopelessly unaware of the economic realities and difficulties facing manufacturers?
But are not most state judges (even the great Cardozo) the products of a rather
political process of appointment and retention election or of full-fledged political
election?
* Although this is not, strictly speaking, a separation of powers issue, should the
relative merits of different judicial selection schemes affect the debate about judicial
116. Yes, we know we are pointing out the obvious, but sometimes seemingly "obvious" points
are lost upon not only law students, but also upon experienced practitioners. One of us once saw an
assistant state attorney general arguing a case before the U.S. Supreme Court interrupted with the
helpful but nonetheless embarrassing (assuming the attorney realized what was happening) intejection
of Justice Stevens: "Counsel, that's your separation of powers argument that you're making, not your
due process argument. Your due process argument posits .. "
The upbraided advocate was not necessarily a bad lawyer; he just lost sight of the legal
classification schema in the heat of oral argument. Do these types of errors provide anything more
meaningful than a law professor's opportunity to "Monday morning quarterback" real counsel trying
to do business with real cases and litigants? Or are the classification schema important? For example,
when might it matter more that a law under review poses separation of powers problems than that it
poses due process problems? Or should due process concerns, being grounded in individual rights and
natural law, always take precedent over the more socially constructed positive law standards of
separation of powers?
117. Whereas federalism tends to focus on the apt division of state and national authority,
separation of powers refers to the division of policy-making authority among the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches. See KUKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 81-83, 86-88.
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activism versus legislative change? Would a purely elected judiciary put it in closer
touch with "the people?" Is this good or bad? Or would a purely elected judiciary
simply bring to the bench the unseemly elements associated with conventional
elective politics (e.g., fund raising, electioneering, media frenzy, distortion, negative
campaigning, and influence peddling)?
" Even so, is the sometimes carnival atmosphere attending legislative and executive
selection worth enduring in order to subject judges to more popular control? Or are
fame and popularity all that matters for judicial selection subject to popular
approval? In light of the example of Justice Alan Page, who was elected to the

Minnesota Supreme Court in 1992 largely on the strength of his high name
recognition and "hero" status as a former professional football player (NFL MVP
in 1972 as a defensive tackle for-you guessed it--the Minnesota Vikings), should
8
there be more or less public input into the judicial selection process?"'
* Why have courts generally been creators (or hospitable receptors of the creative
arguments of counsel) for products liability rules generally favorable to plaintiffs?
Does this suggest that perhaps direct democracy in judicial selection is not an
unalloyed blessing, as it might simply give commercial interests more control over
yet another branch of government? Or is the plaintiff's trial bar the interest group
most likely to benefit from more active judicial elections? Can lessons be learned
from the experiences in Texas and Pennsylvania, to take two well-known examples,
where special interests-particularly lawyers who generally represent personal injury
plaintiffs-have been active and successful in promoting judicial candidates,
9
resulting in criticism of these systems and their resulting case law?" Which interest
arena? Or do
political
in
the
themselves
protect
groups are generally less able to
these considerations simply provide support for more elitist "merit" selection,
removing judges from politics by at least a degree?
* Whatever the method of selection, should judges have life tenure? Or should life
tenure accompany only a merit selection system such as that found in the federal

118. See Alan Page Turns Up a Winner at the Polls,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at 29. By raising
this question, we should make the obvious point that we are not criticizing Justice Page in particular.
One of us who is a member of the Minnesota Bar, continues to follow that state law and generally has
been favorably impressed with Justice Page's performance. But Page also had substantial legal
experience as an attorney in a prestigious Minneapolis firm and in the office of the State Attorney
General. Page might just as easily have ridden his name recognition to the Supreme Court without
having ever practiced law a day in his life. Is this not an uneasy endorsement of more "democracy"
in judicial selection? It has been suggested that, in order to avoid the influence on elections of
irrelevant fame, those in vocations beginning with "A" should be constitutionally disqualified from
office. While this would take care of athletes, actors and astronauts, it would also apply to attorneys
(but not lawyers?).
119. See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Highlightinga Low Point on a High Court: Some Thoughts on
the Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial SelfRegulation,68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1041, 1062-76 (1995) (suggesting advantages of the federal system
over the state system of selection and removal of judges); Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C.
Conner, PartisanElections: The Albatross ofPennsylvania'sAppellate Judiciary,98 DICK. L. REv.
1, 16 n.98, 17 n.99 (1993) (noting the organized plaintiffs bar, and large contributors to judicial
elections, are among the special interests opposing merit selection of judges in Pennsylvania); Peter
D. Webster, Selection andRetention ofJudges: Is There One "Best" Method?., 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
1, 20-22 (1995) (indicating Texas personal injury lawyers, on one side, and insurance defense bar, on
the other, are large contributors, among other special interests, to judicial election candidates).
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court system? Is this sort ofjob security necessary to permit judges to objectively

decide important tort cases such as MacPherson? Or is the sort of insulation found
in the federal system necessary only when a judge faces truly "hot" contemporary
issues such as abortion rights, assisted suicide, or same sex marriage? Do the
"hottest" issues usually end up in federal court rather than state court? Is this
changing? If so, should this affect the judicial selection processes?
o Would the federal judges in the South during the 1950s and 1960s have so
vigorously enforced the mandate of Brown v. Boardof Education20 had they not
held lifetime appointments? "2 ' Is it relevant that, as appears to be the case, one can
find more examples of state judges and justices generally ignoring or undermining
Brown than one can find of federal judges? Or does the answer lie more in the
sociology of the respective benches than in the impact of judicial job security and
separation of powers?
Standing. Since MacPherson was concretely injured in a manner directly traceable
to the defective wheel, and his claim could be aptly satisfied through the traditional
judicial process and award of monetary damages, is there any real question whether
he had standing?
* Why should the system await a MacPherson before deciding the questions presented
in MacPherson? Should safety curmudgeons (the 1916 version of Ralph Nader) be
able to argue for manufacturer liability without privity of contract or direct harm?
• What about associational standing? Should this be sufficient even when the
association is created in order to bring particular claims (e.g., the "New York
Association of Potential Victims of Defective Component Products")?
" Does fastidious adherence to the standing doctrine only make sense in the cases that
usually result in significant judicial opinions-where the plaintiff (individual or
associational) attempts to use the courts to affect a law or policy of the legislative
and executive branches, cases where the separation of powers rationale for standing
doctrine is truly implicated? Or is this an artificial distinction? Is a case like
MacPhersonnot just as important for purposes of regulating society as a case like
Allen v. Wright," in which the Supreme Court denied standing to a group seeking
to challenge the Internal Revenue Service's determination that certain allegedly
discriminatory schools qualified as charitable organizations? If so, should there be
more significant restrictions on standing in so-called "private law" litigation such as
MacPherson?
* Does the recent argument by one legal scholar-that the standing doctrine serves an
important purpose in limiting the ability of activist litigants from picking too
carefully and strategically the cases that will get to a court of last resort concerning
a particular issue-have any bearing on private litigants like MacPherson? 23 Is

120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
122. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
123. See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice: HistoricalEvidence, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 309, 327-30 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabilityand
Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1401-12 (1996).
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there any hint that MacPherson, like the "victims" of contraceptive meddling in
Griswold v. Connecticut,24 positioned himself to have a wheel-related injury so that
he could challenge the parameters of early twentieth century products liability
doctrine?

JusticiabilityandRelated Doctrines. While justiciability and its cousins raise
many of the same issues as to standing, separation of powers, and the political,

ethical, and economic issues previously discussed, are there any substantial grounds
for the court in MacPhersonto refuse to rule on the merits of the case particularly for

lack of justiciability?
* To what extent are courts the most appropriate vehicle for creating and enforcing a
national products liability policy?
* Even if a request for a revision of products liability policy comes clothed in a
traditional lawsuit seeking traditional legal relief, should courts modify justiciability
doctrine to resist deciding such suits? Do courts with a strong view of stare decisis
do just that by adhering so tightly to past precedents, which in MacPherson's case
would have resulted in a denial of relief and the likely shift of the development of
products liability law from the judiciary to the legislature?
Ripeness, Mootness, PoliticalQuestion. Even though these three aspects of the

justiciability doctrine raise issues usually more apt for cases aimed at government
policy or conduct rather than private activity, do they have any role to play in private
litigation? In the particular case of MacPherson?
a In light of the immature development of the market in, and law of, automobiles at the
time MacPhersoncame up on appeal, should the court have declined to rule on the
grounds of ripeness? How might a mootness issue arise?.. 5 Did the case raise a
political question?

124. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. In DeFunisv. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the Court dismissed as moot a law school
applicant's challenge to a University of Washington School of Law affirmative action program on the
ground that applicant DeFunis ultimately was accepted into law school and was proceeding toward
obtaining his degree. Consequently, his complaint about unfairly being denied admission to law school
because a minority group member was shoehorned in ahead of him was "moot." Moreover, it was not
"capable of repetition yet evading review" like the complaint raised by Norma McCorvey, better
known as Jane Roe of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), who obtained an abortion outside of Texas
during the pendency of her lawsuit, because Roe might get pregnant again while DeFunis would
presumably not want to attend law school a second time (although, I suppose, law faculty can be
accused of this error in judgment). The Court then waited five years to take and decide the more
famous affirmative action case Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which struck down the
University of California medical school's affirmative action program that had denied Alan Bakke
admission (Bakke, unlike DeFunis, failed to come in off the waiting list or attend another medical
school). Perhaps more important, Bakke, particularly Justice Powell's concurring opinion, provided
a blueprint for educational institutions seeking to adopt constitutionally permissible affirmative action
programs, a blueprint under siege at this time. See Hopwood v. University of Texas College ofLaw,
84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996). What exactly, if anything, was gained by this five-year delay (except
perhaps the Supreme Court's ability to lie low on the issue for awhile)?
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0 Do cases like these involving such important social issues suggest that the mootness
and ripeness doctrines need to be substantially revised or eliminated? Or do they
instead confirm the thesis that such doctrines act to prohibit courts and interested
litigants from "picking and choosing" too carefully the cases upon which ideological
stands shall be made?
Checks andBalances.26 Is Cardozo' s decision in MacPhersonsubject to adequate
checking and balancing by the legislature?
* Do courts, legislatures, or executives have the upper hand in the "game" of policy
dialogue that determines the final shape of state and national policy? For example,
does a court's ability to apply law (including legislation supposedly overruling an
earlier decision) give it the power to effectively insert the last word notwithstanding
legislative disagreement with the court's first word? Or are judges too upright for
that? Or is statutory language too nonmalleable for that? Or, ultimately, do
executives control the public policy through agenda-setting, veto power (particularly
if line-item veto comes to pass), and the appointment ofjudges (where judges are not
elected)?
" Does the typical discussion about court-legislature colloquy oversimplify the
legislative process? Should a sophisticated discussion consider the complexities of
the legislative process as where, for example, the New York State Assembly might
have violently disagreed with Cardozo's decision in MacPherson while the New
York Senate might have been sufficiently indifferent or favorable to prevent
legislative overruling? 1" What about the prospect of a key committee chair blocking
such legislation, or the governor vetoing the anti-MacPhersonbill? Do these
possibilities put checks and balances on the judiciary in a different light?
• Does the relative power and access of the litigants to the judicial and political
processes provide a legitimate factor for courts to consider when deciding close
cases? Or would this approach simply put courts in the position of playing Robin
Hood, always favoring the less powerful party in close cases?
IndividualRights. Can one think of MacPhersonas a towering individual rights
decision in the same sense as great cases, whether agreed with or not, such as Gideon

126. To avoid the misclassification problem that might prompt upbraiding from the reader, we note
that separation of powers refers to the spheres of authority enjoyed by the various branches, while
checks and balances refers to the sharing of authority over a topic and the manner in which the
branches, acting within their properly circumscribed roles, can act to prevent one another from
controlling an area of law.
127. In actuality, the legislature appears to have been receptive to the MacPherson opinion. In
1924, a statute was enacted essentially codifying the MacPhersonanalysis. See Feitelbcrg v. Matuson,
208 N.Y.S. 786 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1925) (noting that ch. 534, Laws of 1924, added new section 282-e

to the New York Highway Law codifying the concept of strict products liability for unreasonable
danger despite absence of privity).
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2
a Baker v. Carr,'29 Brown v. Board of Education,"'° and Roe v.
v. Wainright,"
3'
Wade?1

" Notwithstanding its less obvious civil rights or political context, can one credibly
characterize MacPhersonas a case with significant constitutional rights questions?
For MacPherson? For Buick? For both? For others waiting in the wings? Why?
* What constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights can one find lurking in
MacPherson? Due process for the injured consumer? For the manufacturer?
" Is it stretching the Contract Clause to argue that Buick should have some degree of
protection for its contractual expectations and that decisions like MacPherson
effectively "impair" the operation of contract?
5.

32

Products LiabilityLaw, Dispute Resolution, and the Adversary System1

Adversarialism. In light of the fact that MacPhersondid not magically descend
on the Court of Appeals as a package tied with a metaphorical bow, but rather
resulted from contested litigation by attorneys who framed and argued the issues,
developed the facts, and sought in different ways to persuade the three courts that
heard the matter, do the majority and dissenting opinions suggest whether the
attorneys representing the two sides did a good job?
* In particular, does it appear that MacPherson's lawyer, Edgar T. Brackett, did his
job well? What, if anything, supports this conclusion? What, if anything, cuts the
other way?
* When MacPherson came to consult with Brackett and retain his services, what would
you, in Brackett's position, have wanted to know about MacPherson's injury in order
to determine whether there was a decent case?
* Under the known circumstances, would it have been worthwhile for you to take the
case even if MacPherson had a good claim under the law? Is this a pertinent
question?
* Do lawyers have responsibilities that supersede this inquiry? Should they have?
What are the pros and cons? If the claim is questionable under the law, how would
you decide whether to pursue it? What are the relevant factors? What additional
facts would you want to know before deciding whether to take the case?
* If MacPherson could not obtain representation by a lawyer as able as Brackett,
would he be better off with no lawyer rather than a mediocre one? In light of his
chances of recovery and his investment of time, emotion, and money (through hourly

128. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the state to provide counsel to indigents facing serious
criminal charges).
129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (requiring reapportionment consistent with the "one person/one vote"
principle to correct severe malapportionment inthe state legislature).
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
131. 410U.S. 113(1973).
132. See generally KUKLiN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, ch. 5 (Law, Dispute Resolution, and the
Adversary System).
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fees, costs and expenses, or both), is he worse off with a mediocre lawyer than with
dropping his claim?
Do cost-benefit analyses of this type always control the decision by a harmed party
to pursue a claim? What else might influence the decision? Should the law accept
these other motives as legitimate? Why? If not, what can be done to prevent them
from actuating the lawsuit?
If MacPherson decided to represent himself, would he, as a pro se plaintiff, have any
realistic chance of winning? Why? If not, what can be done about this? Should
anything be done?
Would it be prudent for Brackett to take the case on a contingency fee basis?
What percentage of the recovery would be reasonable as a fee? As revealed in the
mass media, one-third is the standard contingency rate; what's so magical about this
percentage? Is this the standard rate because of laziness (lawyers use a rule of
thumb because their peers do), uncertainty (lawyers are insecure about their ability
to handicap a particular case), experience (as a general matter, the one-third
convention seems to even out the wins and losses and permit lawyers to earn a
living), or efficiency (by following the convention, lawyers can spend more time
litigating the merits)?
Why does the contingent fee not vary more according to the actual merits of the
claim and the odds of winning the case? Since Brackett was taking on a settled rule
of law, would he have acted improperly if he insisted on two-thirds of the recovery?
If, instead, MacPherson had been the automobile dealer and had been injured
relocating the Buick on his sales lot, his privity allowing him to sue Buick directly
for negligence and to win easily, would a fairer contingency fee be ten or fifteen
percent?
What does fairness have to do with these questions?
Should Brackett take the case on an hourly rate? Why not, as long as MacPherson
can pay the bill? Would this have the perverse incentive of tempting Brackett to
bloat the hours or perform in a lackluster manner?
In defense of the contingency fee, does the fact that a contingency lawyer must win
to eat tend to focus her mind? Or does this tempt her to cut corners and bend the
rules?
On the other hand, is it the fact that unless MacPherson is an upper-middle class auto
owner (and in 1914, the date of the accident, perhaps all auto owners were uppermiddle class or higher), an offer of hourly fee representation amounts to no effective
representation?
Which fee arrangement is better for MacPherson? For Brackett? For society?
Why? How would the trade-offs, if any, be balanced?
What hourly rate in today's dollars would be appropriate? How would an attorney
arrive at this rate? Would these be apt considerations: office overhead, staff
salaries, employee benefits, associate salaries, amortized capital expense (including
the human capital of the lawyer's legal training and experience), malpractice
premiums, library costs, bar memberships, opportunity costs, and the lawyer's net
income goal? What other factors are relevant? How would you decide what dollar
rate to put on each of these items?
Based on your calculations of attorney costs, are current legal fees too high? Too
low?
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Of the three most obvious defendants-the auto dealer, Buick, and the
wheelmaker-who should Brackett sue? Why?
" Can the three potential defendants be sued separately? If so, might the result in the
first trial be determinative of key issues in the actions against the other
defendants?'
* Would a dismissal, summary judgment, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
favor of Buick preclude MacPherson from pursuing a claim against the dealer or the
wheelmaker? What if Buick had won a jury verdict? Would this be an issue
preclusion defense for the dealer and the wheelmaker? 34 Conversely, could
MacPherson use a favorable verdict to bind the dealer and wheelmaker to
liability? 135

* When Brackett, who presumably knew the general rule of the privity defense for
manufacturers, decided to fight the harder fight by taking on Buick, was it because
the dealer was insolvent or uninsured? Or did he simply want a deeper pocket, one
more likely to inspire the jury to impose a large award? If the latter consideration
motivated Brackett, is this legitimate? Why? If not, what can be done about it?
Would you agree that once the battle was joined, Brackett performed admirably
in light of the facts that he hurdled a demurrer from Buick at the trial court level and
36
then presented the case with enough force to obtain a plaintiff's verdict?'
* Although Cardozo's opinion states the evidence of Buick's negligence offhandedly,
how would you, in Brackett's position, have obtained the evidence? Would you
suppose this was more difficult at the time because the case was litigated more than
twenty years before the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a broad
right to discovery in civil actions at law?' 37 Did Brackett get the information through
investigation, such as by witness interviews and phone calls? What if a Buick plant
manager offered him the information for a fee? Should he pay it? Should he report
133. Under the facts as described inthe Court of Appeals opinion, the answer must surely be "no."

134. Not necessarily, it depends on the basis for the decision (presuming it can be discerned) and
the subsequent court's degree of generality in defining what occurred in the first trial. See FLEMING
JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.7-11.22 (4th ed. 1992).
135. Again, the answer is dependent on a number of factors, particularly whether Buick fought the
case on the merits of the defense raised by the others. See id. §§ 11.23-11.26.
136. After prevailing at trial, Brackett defended the verdict on appeal to the Third Department and
won before again successfully defending the verdict before the Court of Appeals. Judge Posner has
characterized the brief as an "excellent" one with a "passionate, populist" tone. See POSNER, supra
note 14, at 109. As an aside, we are, quite frankly, surprised that Posner would characterize a populist
tract as excellent in view of his general unreceptive attitude toward populism. He later praises
Cardozo's opinion precisely because it does not replicate Brackett's rhetoric. See id. Presumably,
however, Judge Posner saw nonpopulist strengths in the brief as well and recognized that the populist
emphasis may have been persuasive to the court even though Cardozo did not incorporate it into the
MacPhersonopinion. Brackett not only argued the doctrinal limits of the privity rule and exceptions
to it, but also made an appeal to the court's notions of operating efficiency and fair access to the courts.
See Brief of Respondent at 21-24, MacPherson v, Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
137. Of course, those federal procedural rules do not control state pretrial practice, even though
the 1938 Federal Rules have influenced the states.
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it? If so, to whom? Under prevailing rules of professional responsibility, is Brackett
even allowed to talk to the manager without Buick's lawyer having an opportunity
to attend?
* How much was the verdict?' 38 Was this fact important to the Court of Appeals in
making its legal ruling? Why? Is it important knowledge for a litigator? Why?
* In sum, what hurdles faced Brackett when he sought compensation for
MacPherson?'39 In deciding whether to sue the dealer alone, must he worry about
the dealer who cannot pay or who has a practical immunity from an adequate jury
award because of local community sentiment? Is the jury really going to stick it to
Friendly Frank's Auto, sponsor of the little league teams for more than twenty years,
for a bad car made by Buick?'" To generalize, what of the pragmatic issue finessed
by Cardozo in MacPherson: should liability for injuries by defective products "be
left to contract (or to the doctrine, loosely contractual, of implied indemnity) or
made a task for tort law?"' 4 Are the practical reasons for choosing tort brought to
the surface in the MacPherson opinion? 42
Is it possible to tell whether Buick's counsel, William Van Dyke, performed well?
As well as Brackett?'43 If Van Dyke had not performed well, would the case have

turned out differently? If not, how might it have differed?
" Does MacPhersonsupport the proposition that the legal system depends on having
good lawyers fairly present the issues to the court? Despite the characterization of
American legal education as largely a cult of the judge, would even Cardozo have
needed to await a better case for launching the twentieth century's products liability
revolution had the lawyers poorly prepared and presented the controversy? If
Brackett had been a rotten lawyer, would Cardozo have been able to act sua sponte
to exhume good legal arguments from a dead brief and oral argument?
* In this regard, what are the limits to the judge's power at the appellate level? Is this
essentially a moot question because, if MacPherson's lawyer had not been
competent, the case would never have made it to the Court of Appeals due to a

138. Cardozo does not say.
139. The administrative costs, risks, and strategic behavior are suggested by the textual questions,
supra part II.B.2.
140. These factors, including the administrative costs raised above, were discussed in Brackett's
brief with a length and sophistication unusual for the time. See Brief of Respondent at 21-24.
Remember that the Brandeis Brief in Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which was considered
a revolutionary marshaling of policy arguments and supporting sources, was less than a decade old.
Recall, too, that for all its fame, the Brandeis Brief is what we would now regard as a crude, verbose,
unsubstantiated attempt at injecting social science policy concerns into legal doctrine. Measured
against this background, Brackett's use of these arguments becomes even more impressive.
141. POSNER, supra note 14, at 108-09.
142. See id. at 109.
143. A review of the available record suggests that Buick's counsel, William Van Dyke, was no
slouch, although his brief is less impressive, and the case outcome suggests that Brackett bested him
in other aspects of the case as well. See Brief of Appellant, MacPherson, Ill N.E. 1050. One hates
to criticize a lawyer who cannot fire back. But, let's be brutally honest, a lawyer on the side of the
clear majority rle (privity) who loses at trial, in the Appellate Division, and only gets one vote in the
Court of Appeals has been whipped.
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probable dismissal, a defense verdict, a failure to timely appeal, removal from the
system by a cheap settlement, etc.?'" Could the incompetence of MacPherson's
counsel have been redeemed by the lower courts that heard the case? 4 ' What are
the limits to their powers in this regard?
" Are most real world trial judges simply too swamped by their caseloads to play Sir
Galahad and rescue errant counsel? If Brackett had not been an able lawyer, is it
likely that MacPhersonwould have turned out quite differently, along with the entire
law of defective products?
* What if, without a precedent-setting case in MacPherson,the leading case came
down at a time of greater ideological conservatism, strain on national resources, or
dissatisfaction with litigation claims? Would the law of products liability have been
forever changed by this?
Professional Responsibility. How might the outcome of the case have differed if
Van Dyke or Buick had violated professional ethics? For example, what if Buick
workers were coached to claim to have inspected the wheel and found no discernible
flaw? What if Buick had forged records?
* IfBuick initiated the posited coverup itself, would Van Dyke be negligent for failing
to ferret it out? Or would his ethical concerns be triggered only if he stumbled onto
the plot? Once Van Dyke knows of the deception, by whatever means, can he reveal
it to the opposition or the court? Must he reveal it? Does any interpretation of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct permit Van Dyke to withdraw from representation and say nothing?
* Is the dependence of the adversary system on the vigilance and tenacity of plaintiff's
counsel to expose defense shenanigans, and vice versa, a misplaced hope? Is
unethical practice more or less likely to occur in a system administered by an
inquisitorial judge under the European model?
* Would it have been unethical solicitation if Brackett was happening by when the
Buick wheel collapsed and, after rushing to MacPherson's aide, Brackett gave him
a business card and apprised him of his right to sue? Should it be? What if Brackett
also claimed to be, and was, the best plaintiffs tort lawyer in the state? What if he
accompanied MacPherson to the hospital and frequently called on him to check on
his progress? Do these facts make our hypothetical Bracken's behavior better or
worse? Why?
* What exactly was the bar seeking to accomplish with its restrictions on soliciting and
advertising? Was it pure self-interest? Which situation is better: the one at the turn
of the century before MacPherson's injury when the profession was not closely
144. Of course, inthe two-way street of adversarialism, a good deal of this hypothesizing depends
on the caliber of defense counsel as well, who must make at least adequate dismissal motions, trial
presentation, or settlement offers to terminate even the case championed by a lawyer buffoon.
145. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Judgment of Solomon and the Experience ofJustice, in THE
STRucrunRE OF PROCEDURE 447, 449 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979) (discussing the

biblical story of Solomon's judgment as an example of active judicial intervention that broke an
adversarial logjam to unearth the truth); Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296 (1976) (discussing a judge's discretionary power and
opportunity to shape litigation process and case relief).
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regulated, or the one seventy-five years later in which Brackett could buy a thirtysecond spot on television to tout his services?
0 What if Brackett had advertised in the newspaper or by handbills and MacPherson
had responded? Does this form of self-promotion differ all that greatly from "Buickchasing?" In responding to these questions of professional responsibility, what
moral principles are involved? How?"
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). To return to the point where the injured

Donald MacPherson first limped into the law office, in light of the state of the law
in 1914, should Brackett have attempted to resolve the claim short of litigation?
47
Because ADR was still unnamed in 1914, would we say that it was nonexistent?
Or would we surmise that settlement was then the leading form of ADR, just as it is
today? 1 '
* Do you support the procedures today implemented by the courts that fuse
adjudication and ADR, such as the summary jury trial and appointment of settlement
masters?' 49 Why?
" In Brackett's position, would you have written a demand letter to the dealer and
Buick seeking an informal compensation agreement for MacPherson? Is this wise
or futile? Do ethical precepts and the spirit (if not the precise letter) of the 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 require counsel to explore
settlement before filing a complaint or initiating an ADR device such as arbitration?
* How would you have attempted to settle? Is a shot across the figurative bow of
Buick the best way to produce a serious offer, or is more diplomacy in order?
Should Brackett have stressed to Buick and its dealer the probable adverse publicity
146. See generally Russell G. Pearce, Rediscoveringthe Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Code, 6 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHIcs 241 (1992); Geoffrey C. Hazard et a]., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed
to Advertise: A Market Analysis ofLegal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1083 (1983); Russell G. Pearce
et al., Project, An Assessment ofAlternative Strategiesfor IncreasingAccess to Legal Services, 90
YALE L.J. 122 (1980).
147. Certainly ADR was not the booming field of today that finds mandatory stock exchange
arbitration, a large and growing American Arbitration Association, and a plethora of other private
judging, arbitration, and mediation services. The move to ADR has become sufficiently strong that
at least one law firm is now insisting that all employees, even the associates, sign employment contracts
providing for mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. See Mark Curriden, Sign it, Alston &
Bird Staff Told, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 25.
148. It appears to have been just as prevalent in 1914 as it is today. According to one reviewer,
available evidence suggests that cases settle at a rate of about 90% plus, irrespective of the devices
employed by courts and the litigants to seek nonadjudicative resolution of matters. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, For andAgainst Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the MandatorySettlement Conference, 33
UCLA L. REV. 485, 488 n.19 (1985) ("[Tihere is no empirical evidence that settlement rates have
changed in response to increased settlement conference activity. Settlement rates of about 90% are
remarkably constant in civil litigation, criminal cases, and family cases.") (citing Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
OurAllegedly Contentious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1984)).
149. For a more comprehensive review of popular forms of ADR, see RoGER S. HAYDOCK ErAL.,
FuNDAMENTALs oF PRETRAL LITIGATION §§ 26-31 (3d ed. 1994).
150. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26(a) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (requiring candid pleading,
mandatory negotiations, and mandatory early disclosure of basic case information as well as increased
expert witness disclosure).
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resulting from the case even if the defense of privity (or other defenses) is
successful? Is this type of "graymail" improper? In any case, is it imprudent
because it raises the temperature of the litigation, possibly prompting Buick to
engage in a war of attrition against the smaller plaintiff?
What remedies should MacPherson pursue? Although the law's default mechanism
is a monetary award, are there advantages to the greater flexibility of settlement? If
so, what are they? Are there disadvantages? Would MacPherson prefer less
compensation for lost income or pain and suffering in return for Buick's
commitment to provide medical care, physical therapy, medication and, if necessary,
nursing care to him throughout his life?
What if MacPherson had been a social activist in the Ralph Nader mold who
preferred less of a personal remedy in return for Buick's commitment to adopt safer
manufacturing and testing procedures? Would it have been proper for him to insist
that Buick change wheel suppliers? If so, would the supplier have had a claim
against MacPherson for tortious interference with contractual relations, or did the
nature of the negotiation immunize MacPherson from such a claim?
What means of ADR, if any, would best have served MacPherson? Because Buick
would be unlikely to agree to it, is it bad strategy to seek a method of ADR that is
too favorable? What lines in the sand would you draw that, if crossed, would
prompt you to litigate full speed ahead?
Would MacPherson have been attracted to arbitration because of speed or reduced
legal fees? Under the circumstance that arbitrators need not strictly follow the law,
would MacPherson be better off with arbitrators liberated from the precedential
force of Winterbottom v. Wright and the privity of contract defense? Or is it more
likely that only a prestigious bench such as the Court of Appeals would be likely to
feel self-confident enough to change the law or find MacPherson's case an exception
to the general rule?
If MacPherson's sale agreement contained an arbitration clause, would it have been
enforceable? By Buick as well as the dealer? Should it be? Should MacPherson
be wary enough of arbitration to fight the clause in court? 5'
Does the virtue to MacPherson of an arbitration clause depend on the named
arbitrators, say, a group of auto executives rather than a panel from the American
Arbitration Association? Might this affect the enforceability of the clause?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of mediation for MacPherson? For
Buick?
Would you suppose that mediation provides a less adversarial, but structured, mode
of interaction more likely to produce flexible agreements? But might mediation's
informality work to the detriment of disputants with less sophistication and power?
Might Buick or the dealer take advantage of MacPherson in a mediation?
What would you want to know about the mediator? About MacPherson's
background, education, socioeconomic status, or personality? Are these concerns
mitigated or eliminated if an attorney represents MacPherson during the mediation,

151. While the common law did not mandate specific enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements, this changed dramatically with the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1926, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988). But even prior to the Act, most courts would enforce a postdispute arbitration

agreement such as that contemplated in our reworking of the MacPhersonfacts.
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particularly a good attorney like Brackett? But what if MacPherson had a weak
lawyer? Would you conclude that the realities of adversarialism, lawyering skills,
and law office economics affect the case even if it is not litigated?
0 Would you favor hybrid or judicially annexed dispute resolution methods, such as
use of a court-appointed settlement master, court-annexed arbitration, or the
summary jury trial? Why? How much does the local bench matter?
Federalism. Although MacPhersonis obviously not a case about federalism or
court allocation of functions, is its path and outcome nevertheless influenced by the
overarching infrastructure of the legal system? Are the issues in MacPherson
generally state or federal matters? Although the sphere of federal lawmaking has
steadily increased since the New Deal, does it appear that the core common law and
private law subjects remain largely committed to the states (and to state courts) rather
than the federal government? Why, despite the best efforts of the manufacturing
community, has Congress continued to resist enacting a nationwide products liability
act?' 52
* Even though the legal landscape was more tilted toward state lawmaking in 1916
than it is today, and, consequently, the privity defense interposed by Buick, although
widely accepted, was not by any means a national rule, what effect would you
suppose ensued from the advent of better official state reporting and West
Publishing's regional case reporter system in the 1880s?
* As the state courts and practicing bar became increasingly conversant in the law of
other states, would the rules, though still set locally, compete Darwinian-like in the
national "market" for acceptance by the legal profession?
* If so, what is the standard of "fitness" for a rule? Why might certain states and
courts be more influential than others? Does it depend on the state's economy? For
example, was it relevant that the New York Court of Appeals was located in the
nation's dominant commercial state? Is the quality of the court's personnel
influential? How i3this determined? Is a single outstanding judge enough to make
the entire court influential?
* Against this backdrop, would you suppose that it is probably not surprising that
MacPherson came to be influential? Would it have been equally influential if
adopted by a lesser court from a noncommercial state? Do you think that Cardozo
was anticipating its pervasive influence when he wrote the opinion? If so, would he
still have focused mainly on New York law? Why did he refer extensively to
English law? To undermine the continued influence of Winterbottom v. Wright?
Why was this English case influential? Was it because much of New York common
law was imported from England, particularly during the colonial period and early
years of statehood? Could we say that looking at English precedent was the
functional equivalent of looking at older New York cases?
152. The drive for such an act is perhaps the legacy of the unanticipated success of MacPherson,
as products liability claims are now regarded by many as too frequent, too lucrative for plaintiffs, and
too expensive for business. Ironically, the 1990s finds conservative political interests in the unusual
role of advocating more federal government control of American life. Which kind(s) of conservatives
favor this federal control-Lockeans, Smitheans, or Burkeans?
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0 What motivated Cardozo to cite cases cutting against the rule of MacPhersonfrom
another state 5 ' and from the federal system?" 4 Since the two federal cases found
an automobile not to be an inherently dangerous product falling within an exception
to the privity defense, were they cited simply as strawmen for Cardozo's telling
response that "[w]e think that injury to others is to be foreseen not merely as a
possibility, but as an almost inevitable result," citing Professor Bohlen's "trenchant
criticism" of the federal cases?'55 Indeed, was Cardozo engaging in subtle
argumentation to portray MacPhersonas a routine case since he characterized one
56
of the federal cases as finding that New York law was to the contrary.
* Because MacPhersonexpands a consumer's right of action against the manufacturer,
is the opinion more likely to be persuasive if it displays an awareness of
noncontrolling contrary case law and effectively refutes it? Was Cardozo refuting
the federal cases since, as a practical matter, they were persuasive to many observers
because of the prestige of federal courts? Was Cardozo, then, by painting the federal
cases as mistaken in their benign view of an automobile's potential for damage,
increasing the chances for MacPherson'sacceptance in other jurisdictions and its
enthusiastic following in lower New York courts?' 57
0 Is the additional fame of Cardozo as the author of MacPherson misplaced?
Although Cardozo is traditionally painted as the legal pioneer behind MacPherson
153. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (citing Hayes v. Hyde
Park, 27 N.E. 522 (Mass. 1891)).
154. Id. at 1053-54 (citing Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1915) and
Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903)). Cardozo quickly cites a Kentucky
Supreme Court case to the contrary, Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1911). Id at
1054.
155. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054 (citing Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative
Obligations in the Law of Torts, 44 AM. LAW. REG. (N.S.) 337, 351 (1905) [53 U. PA. L. REv. 337,
351] (citation corrected)).
156. See id at 1054 ("Indeed Judge Sanborn [of the Eighth Circuit] concedes that his view is not
to be reconciled with our decision in Devlin v. Smith (supra). The doctrine of that decision has now
become the settled law of this state, and we have no desire to depart from it.").
157. Although we again illustrate the obvious for experienced lawyers, students will profit from
learning that the decreed law of a high court or legislature is enforced with varying degrees of
enthusiasm by lower courts, many of whom may even actively resist changes in doctrine that they have
come to know and love (or at least respect).
A ready example emerges from civil procedure, where many courts gave-at best-a grudging
reception to the new liberalized pleading standards embodied in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rear guard action of the lower courts was arguably not stamped out until nearly two
decades later when the Supreme Court issued Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (noting
court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it is clear "beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief').
Today, observers argue that lower courts have moved back toward more stringent pleading
standards despite the continued ostensible hegemony of Conley. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of FactPleadingUnder the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435-37
(1986). In fact, the most recent Supreme Court caselaw has largely upheld the liberal pleading ethos
of the 1938 Rules. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993). But in 1995, Congress enacted legislation codifying stringent pleading
requirements for certain securities fraud claims. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Students are usually
surprised to find the justice system is considerably less vertically integrated and controlled than they
had been led to believe by doctrine.
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and the fall of the citadel of privity,'58 is this overgenerous to him in light of the fact
that MacPherson's claim for an expanded reach of tort law was accepted by both the
trial court and the intermediate appellate court that heard the case?
* Does this undeserved glory stem from the conventional law school wisdom, not
entirely disinterested, positing that great innovations or breaks with tradition
originate from the high appellate courts and the great progressive, academically
oriented judges? 59
e Is it closer to the truth to suggest that legal change builds from the ground up,
invisible hand-like, more than it is decreed from the top down?
* Or would you conclude that if the legal topography of New York in the period
between 1914-16 was so favorable to consumers injured by defective products that
a lawyer, a trial judge, intermediate judges, and a nearly unanimous Court of
Appeals saw privity as no barrier to MacPherson's claim, that perhaps the case was
almost as unrevolutionary as Cardozo's opinion made out?"6

6.

Historical,Jurisprudential,
and MultidisciplinaryInfluences on Products
16 1
Liability Law'

To situate Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson in the context of the history of

jurisprudence, 62 can it be seen as one that rejects formalism in fact, while
158. And, of course, with this article, we are becoming part of that traditional Cardozo cult.
159. As his later opinions such as Palsgrafand Ultramaressuggest, Cardozo may not have been
such a strong progressive after all. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 109-24 (just as Holmes was
not the liberal painted by his First Amendment dissents). But Cardozo was certainly academic in bent.
He was active in the American Law Institute, kept abreast of scholarly commentary, and frequently
cited it in his opinions. See id. at 132-34. When asked to deliver the prestigious Storrs lectures at
Yale, he responded with what became The Nature of the JudicialProcess.
160. For example, while criticizing the federal cases finding an automobile not to be inherently
dangerous, Cardozo took pains to argue that his opinion did not change principles of law but simply
applied them more realistically to automobiles and modem life. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054.
161. See generally KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, ch. 6 (Historical, Jurisprudential, and
Multidisciplinary Influences on Law).
162. Beginning law students cannot be expected to come to law school knowing enough about the
jurisprudential trends of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to discuss the following
questions in class. In our view, a quick crash course in the intellectual history of modem jurisprudence
and some "spoon-feeding" of background information will quickly enable students to see what is at
work in MacPhersonand other cases in which various world views of law compete for acceptance by
the legal system.
The various schools of jurisprudence could also be termed "paradigms" of law, although this is
perhaps stretching the notion of what constitutes a paradigm as the term was used in Thomas Kuhn's
classic work The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. However, as applied to periods of strong legal
cohesion around a controlling adjudication model or jurisprudential theory, "paradigm" may be the apt
word. According to Kuhn, a controlling paradigm exists in a discipline when its practitioners generally
agree about underlying axioms and most research activity in the discipline is devoted to determining
significant facts, matching facts with theory, and further articulating accepted theory. In addition, the
discipline is dominated by a set method of training and entry into the profession and a clear group of
decisionmakers determining what constitutes "correct" science. See THOMAS KuHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF ScIENiFIC REVOLUTIONS 25-35 (2d ed. 1970).
In modem law, the degree of variance among legal elites and the popularity of somewhat
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simultaneously giving lip service to formalism in principle?' 63 What about the
opinion supports your conclusion? Could one defend the proposition that the opinion
is also an example of the fusion and application of pre-realist realism and Roscoe
Pound's sociological jurisprudence?'" If so, how?
" Although courts exist, in the main, to resolve disputes, what other functions do they
serve?
* For that matter, even when resolving disputes, does every court case involve a
significant or close legal issue or the opportunity to amend doctrine or favor one or
If not, what makes a case routine?
more of several competing legal approaches?'
Is MacPhersonone of them? To the extent that it is not, in the context of the major
schools of legal thought, how would you assess Cardozo's choices and, perhaps, his
rhetorical blurring of those choices?
* In assessing MacPherson from the vantage points of the three commonly accepted
notions of what constitutes jurisprudence-a theory of law, a theory of legal
interpretation, or a theory of adjudication's-how germane to understanding the
particular case is the "what is law?" prong ofjurisprudence? Is this prong germane
to the general issues surrounding contracts, torts, or products liability law? If so,
how? What are the basic sources of these legal subjects? Does Cardozo attend to
any of these sources in MacPherson? Does he neglect any? If so, should he have
invoked the missing ones? Why? Does it always improve the persuasive force of
an opinion to muster the entire range of the sources of law? When, if ever, might it
not?
" How do the sources of law in the common law system compare to the sources in the
civil law system? Why does our society accept the common law system of courtmade law for important issues such as products liability?
* Would we be better off adopting the civil law approach, at least in part? Why?
Could Cardozo have done this in writing MacPherson? If private law in the
common law system is to some extent "what the judges say it is," then why did
Cardozo style his opinion in such a constrained manner? Was it merely to be
politically persuasive? Or is there something about our sources of law that demands
this sort of incremental deference to the past or, at least, that requires judges to
pretend to have such reverence for precedent?' 67 What might this be?
nonfundamentalist jurisprudence, such as critical legal studies and feminist theory, makes today's
eclectic jurisprudence something short of a full-fledged paradigm. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New
Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and
Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 695-705 (1993). But the Langdellian high formalism,
sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and Harvard Legal Process School that chronologically
surround MacPherson are close to fitting the Kuhn criteria but for the seemingly inevitable arguments
that occur between legal elites.
163. For a discussion of formalism, see KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 143-45, 147-50.
164. See id. at 150-53.
165. Cardozo answered in the negative. See CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 164-65.
166. See KuKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 140.
167. Cardozo may not have been feigning his respect for precedent despite his sugar coating on
the reach of MacPherson. In assessing Cardozo, Posner concludes that the "vast majority of his
opinions apply established principles without altering them.... [MacPherson]and a few others are
generative opinions, but the total number is small." POSNER, supranote 14, at 126.
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* Would you say that jurisprudence as a theory of interpretation has relatively less
immediate importance for contract and tort law, as well as the MacPherson
decision? Is it irrelevant? Why? When is it most relevant? Is it important to the
daily practice of the law? If so, how?
* Does the identification of Cardozo's MacPhersonmethodology, both the ostensible
method and the hidden approaches, bring us to the third prong of jurisprudence: a
theory of adjudication? Based on MacPherson, how would you characterize
Cardozo's interpretive style? His ground rules for adjudication? Is his general style
one of functionalism or instrumentalism, just as the MacPhersonopinion is below
the surface? What supports this? Is there evidence in MacPherson to the contrary?
" Could you muster as evidence against his formalism the observation that Cardozo
was not comparing the Buick to coffee urns, poison, and aerated water according to
technical criteria on the similarity of the offending products because, if he was, he
would have concluded that the privity defense is not a bar to a third party's
negligence action only when the product causing injury involves dangerous liquid?
Would a formalist conclude that since MacPherson was injured by a collapsing
wheel, rather than a spouting, defective radiator, he would not qualify under the
exception to the privity rule?
* Is this extreme approach to classifying and comparing precedent absurd? Does it
bespeak the type of high formalism that was such an inviting target for the legal
realists (as well as Holmes and Pound)?' Though this example may be particularly
outlandish,'69 does it suggest why formalism fell from fashion? In light of this
example, would you conclude that Cardozo's approach to interpreting facts is
functional or instrumentalist: he does not worry about what the products excepted
from the privity rule look, smell, or taste like, instead he worries about whether they
have qualities that facilitate injuries when they are defectively produced? Then,
does his interpretative template extend to the big picture (primarily here the
operational distinctions between products, cases, and situations), rather than to a
matching of laundry lists of similarities that may be misleading or irrelevant?' 70

168. See KUKLiN& STETPEL, supra note 4, at 147-57.
169. But not too far from some case realities. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), the Supreme Court per Justice Rehnquist (joined by five other justices) concludes that
discrimination against workers on the basis of pregnancy does not violate the gender discrimination
ban of Title VII because only women get pregnant, therefore pregnancy discrimination does not
involve disparate treatment of the sexes. Congress was as unimpressed with this formalism as were
the realists with Langdell and Beale. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076, was soon passed to override Gilbert.
170. In the main, most of the jurisprudential action in a first-year course of study focuses on the
nature of adjudication: not so much the approaches of courts in interpreting precedent, statutes or
other texts, but rather the manner in which they decide disputes. There are exceptions even in the first
year. Constitutional law may have a heavy interpretative slant. So, too, could contracts courses or any
class closely examining a statute. A course in legal process may explicitly raise these jurisprudential
concerns. Most commonly, however, courses stress the rules and method of decision more than the
interpretive approach at work. This is the primary reason the case method is used, and this will surely
be the emphasis in a legal process, contracts, or torts class examining MacPherson. From this
jurisprudential vantage point, MacPhersonprovides an interesting example of a court employing a
mixture ofjurisprudential schools on both the surface and subterranean levels.

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

0 Did Cardozo stress natural law? Did he make any reference to it? If so, where?
Would you say that, at a minimum, his opinion proceeded from unstated natural law
or natural rights assumptions about an injured party's right to compensation, the
general limits of tort law, or the utility of contract for ordering legal relationships?
Does this latter assumption implicitly adopt a natural law view of the value of private
autonomy and personal decisionmaking?
0 If Cardozo was a high formalist in the Langdell/Beale tradition, how would he have
approached the decision in MacPherson? Would he have erected a stronger version
of the privity citadel at the outset of the case and then, almost deductively, applied
the rule to the facts of the case? How would he have coped with the precedential
exceptions to the rule?
* To go back a moment, can Cardozo's tack of acknowledging, indeed, paying homage
to, the rule while emphasizing the long-standing exceptions that appear to be
growing with the proliferation of modem, potentially dangerous products, be viewed
as a more moderate and flexible formalism? 7' Or is it better seen as an example of
the Holmesian proto-legal realism? 7 2
0 Or is MacPhersoneven better seen as employing, both on the surface and below,
Roscoe Pound's Sociological Jurisprudence, which focuses on the actual effects of
legal rules in action as well as efforts to make law a more effective part of a
progressive social policy?' 73 Does this explain Cardozo's tactic of expressly
recognizing the privity defense principle while finding that it would work unjustly
when applied to the instant case unless the wheel's collapse was sited within the
exceptions to the privity rule, like poison, coffee urns, aerated water, and
scaffolding? Pursuant to what he perceived to be a progressive social policy, did he
analogize automobiles to the dangers of a former era and then seek, self-consciously,
to mold the legal rule and exceptions to fit with current technology?
• Below the surface, does it seem that Cardozo was driven by all the explicit policy
factors noted in Brackett's brief for MacPherson, but unmentioned in the opinion:
externalities; inefficiency; high transaction costs; an undeserved favoritism to
manufacturers over consumers that brings attendant unfairness, wealth transfer, and
greater risk to safety? Was Cardozo, right from Pound's playbook, implicitly
balancing these social effects and the parties' particular interests against the legal
system's interest in retaining a precedent, even though it may have been more in tune
with an earlier era of custom-made goods when buyers were as able to inspect for
defects as were the artisans they patronized?
* To return to Cardozo's theory of judicial decisionmaking as detailed in his famous
tract, The Nature ofthe JudicialProcess,74 does MacPhersonreveal Cardozo as the
restrained Poundite that he seemed to portray himself as in the book? Reexamining
parts of his taxonomy, is "the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy," whereby
"[t]he directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical

171. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
172. See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 150-51 (discussing Holmes).

173. See id. at 151-53.
174. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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progression,""' essentially a formalistic approach tempered by flexibility regarding
the categorization and use of precedent?
* Was his preferred "method of sociology," which in his view vied for dominance in
judicial decisionmaking with the method of philosophy by embracing "the directive
force of a principle .. along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the
mores of the day,"' essentially Pound's Sociological Jurisprudence infused with
significant elements of legal realism?
* Might this preferred method of his be described as a functionalism or
instrumentalism that seeks to give legal rules functional utility for addressing real
life problems?'"T Or, as seen in the MacPhersonopinion, is there something more
in this approach in that Cardozo was willing to change or amend the rules altogether
where functional construction
or application alone could not serve the social policy
7
goals of enlightened law?' 1
* Even though the formalist method has "a certain presumption in its favor,"'" does
the MacPhersonopinion reveal that, in Cardozo's view, the priority of this first
method is overcome by historical (evolutionary) developments, community customs,
and factors of "justice, morals and social welfare."' 80
* Is the issue of the case one for which, because no amount of flexibility or wisdom
inwielding the general rule is adequate to the task of fair resolution, the general rule
must change according to the dictate that, in these situations when "[a]ll is fluid and
changeable," the judge "must then fashion law for the litigants before him?"''
Where, if at all, did Cardozo make out these arguments for rejecting the formalistic
priority? If he did not make them out, why not?
" Did his statement of the facts of the case, along with his characterization of the facts
of the cases he cites as authority point irresistibly toward this conclusion that a
formalistic resolution would not do? In other words, did he load the factual
characterizations in the opinion so strongly that the normative aspects, and the
judicial decisionmaking ones, become apparent and persuasive to the careful reader?
175. See KuKLiN& STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 151-53.
176. See id.
177. According to Cardozo: "[The social value ofa rule has become a test of growing power and
importance. This truth is powerfully driven home to the lawyers of this country in the writings of Dean
Pound." CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 73. Cardozo then quoted Pound as noting that "[plerhaps the
most significant advance in the modem science of law is the change from the analytical to the
functional attitude" and that the emerging test for measuring judicial wisdom has shifted from "the
content of the precept and the existence of the remedy to the effect of the precept in action and the
availability and efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised." Id.
178. According to Cardozo:

In this perpetual flux [of law], the problem which confronts the judge is in reality a twofold
one: he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the ratio decidendi; he
must then determine the path or direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if
it is not to wither and die.
Id. at28.
179. Id. at 31.
180. Id.
181. Id.at2l,28.
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Is spin-doctoring a legitimate tactic in judicial decisionmaking? Or should a judge
be more explicit for the better edification of the bench and bar?
" Even though Cardozo's influential tract and the MacPherson opinion are clearly
products of their era in their close resemblances to Pound, can they also be made out
as harbingers of the future by viewing them (with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, of
course) as anticipating a good deal of legal realism,' the Hart & Sacks Harvard
Legal Process approach, 83 the modem "Fundamental Rights" school of natural
86
law,'4 law and economics,' the law and society movement,' Schauer's kinder,
8
gentler formalism, 8 ' and even critical legal studies?"'
" To continue to make out Cardozo as a fountain of most subsequent jurisprudential
movements, could one reasonably insist that, although feminist jurisprudence did not
exist when Cardozo wrote or decided cases, his textured and contextual approach for
The Nature of the Judicial Process and the MacPherson case places him
comfortably close to that school of thought as well?
" In short, is Cardozo's high standing in legal history explained in part by his eclectic
89
pragmatism as ajurisprudential scholar and judge?' By seeming to have something
182. Judges are shaped by "forces which they do not recognize and cannot name" that "have been
tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is an
outlook on life, a conception of social needs" which in close cases "must determine where choice shall
fall." Id. at 12. "I have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but
creation .... Id. at 166.
183. The legal process approach was thought to constrain judges and reduce the realist revolution's
potential for producing arbitrary outcomes or ajurisprudence of personal policy preference. Cardozo
was in sync with the Hart & Sacks methodology in that he acknowledged legislative supremacy and
a constrained judicial role where rules could be functionally interpreted to result in acceptable case
outcomes. See id. at 14-18.
184. See id. at 134-35 (stressing the importance of morality and justice in law). See also KUKLIN
& STENEEL, supra note 4, at 164-67, Many writing in this school deny they subscribe to a natural law
jurisprudence, but in our view only a modem version of natural law thinking can sustain the claim of
these authors, particularly Ronald Dworkin, to have deduced objectively correct answers to value-laden
constitutional and policy questions absent majority indications of agreement with their conclusions.
185. Cardozo identified with the utilitarian cause and portrayed the adjudication process as one
of virtually constant cost-benefit analysis. See CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 112-23.
186. See KuKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 171-72.
187. See generallyFrederick Schauer, Formalism,97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). But Cardozo was not
championing high formalism. He stressed in his masterpiece that the common law method of reasoning
is inductive rather than deductive and that case holdings must not follow rules so slavishly as to
produce unfair outcomes. See CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 22-23, 150-51, 160-63.
188. "We are tending more and more toward an appreciation of the truth that, after all, there are
few rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees." CARDozo, supra note 49, at 161. Cardozo
probably would not have been awarded a Crit membership card, however, A few pages earlier, he
defended traditional reliance on precedent, saying "I think adherence to precedent should be the rule
and not the exception," largely on grounds of streamlining the judicial burden and making himself, in
retrospect, seem a law and economics trailblazer. Id. at 149. For the trail followers, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 Qn.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989); Jonathan
R. Macey, The Internal and ExternalCosts and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 93
(1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
189. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 132 (identifying Cardozo's lasting strong reputation as
primarily the result of skillful judicial rhetoric, pragmatism, realism, instrumentalism, and
antiformalism).
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for everybody, even six decades after he wrote The Nature of the JudicialProcess,
should his reputation be downgraded as a mere "cut-and-paste" eclectic? Or is his
approach deep and subtle, and worthy of earning him continued respect from the
various jurisprudential constituencies upon which he anachronistically, presciently
draws?
To summarize, does the MacPherson opinion illustrate the multifaceted
jurisprudential side of Cardozo? Or does it merely reflect one or two of his devices?
Would there be too much reading between the lines to advance the case on one of his
opinions that is not only clothed in a post-Landellian style of formality and deference
to precedent, and the not yet articulated legal process style of constrained judicial
activism, but also loaded with implicit use of sociological jurisprudence, legal
realism, economic analysis, and a modern, hybrid pragmatist/practical reason
approach to both deciding the particular case and articulating a sensible legal policy
rule for the future? Had Cardozo been trapped in any one jurisprudential approach,
would MacPhersonhave come out differently?"9
CONCLUSION

In this essay, we have tried to demonstrate in a sustained manner the efficacy and
general educational value of the multidisciplinary and foundational examination of
law school materials. We have not pushed our particular illustration to its limits, for
other possible lines of inquiry are available, but most of them stray from the details
of the case beyond the point of this demonstrative exercise and into the many diverse
threads of the law's seamless web. There are times and places in legal education for
continued pursuit of the threads, but this essay is not one of them.
While our illustration relied on a leading judicial opinion, we believe the study of
other legal authorities and the use of diverse teaching approaches will be enriched by
the broadened and deepened analysis advanced. We have not recited the means by
which these perspectives may be introduced and developed, or which of them may
be appropriate for particular topics, courses, curricula or students, for we believe
these academic decisions are best left to individual professors and depend on their
interests and knowledge. Yet we believe a basic understanding is not difficult to
achieve and offers beneficial uses in virtually any law school setting without
requiring dramatic reorganization of course format.
Although extratextual consideration of the law has been a part of legal education
since at least the sociological jurisprudence and legal realist movements, we end by
reasserting our view that providing sustained background information to students and
regular use ofthat foundational information are helpful means of both enhancing the
study of law and preparing students for practicing law in a world where law, policy,
and values are interwoven.

190. As another example of a multifaceted jurisprudential analysis of a case, see KUKLIN &
SThMPEL, supra note 4, at 185-90 (examining a hypothetical gender discrimination case and likely
outcomes according to different jurisprudential schools).

